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Cannibalization is the removal of a working or functional component from one 
aircraft for installation in another non-flyable aircraft. The purpose of this thesis is to 
analyze the practice of cannibalization in the MV-22 community and evaluate how 
practices vary between the different MV-22 squadrons, all of which are governed by the 
same Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP). This research will explore how 
cannibalization in the community has trended over time and between squadrons to 
evaluate significant changes that have taken place in the community since standing up the 
MV-22 program. Performing a between-squadron analysis of cannibalization will also 
identify the drivers of cannibalization in the community and reveal how those drivers 
vary over time. This between-squadron analysis will reveal if the practice of 
cannibalization actually contributes to overall aircraft availability. This analysis will 
identify the associated costs of cannibalization to the squadrons in terms of maintenance 
man-hours exhausted to remove and install components, and in terms of how it increases 
the unit’s not mission capable maintenance (NMCM) time. This research will give an 
insight into how the practice and problem of cannibalization can be expected to trend as 
new squadrons continue to transition to the MV-22 platform. The comparative analysis 
will provide maintenance officers with informed decisions to better manage their 
available resources as well as provide recommendations on their alternatives to manage 
cannibalization. 
B. BACKGROUND 
This section briefly describes cannibalization as a general term and introduces the 
squadrons and support activities in the MV-22 community. 
1. Cannibalization 
The purpose of cannibalization is to return non-flyable aircraft to flying status. 
Maintenance managers use this practice to consolidate parts across multiple non-flyable 
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aircraft in an effort to make more flyable aircraft in the process. This practice is intended 
to minimize the effect that a constrained supply system might have on an aircraft 
maintenance department’s overall readiness.  
The practice of cannibalization differs across and within all the branches of 
service. The definition of cannibalization, reasons for cannibalizing, and the impacts of 
cannibalization all differ and are not standardized across squadrons. Policies governing 
the practice, views, and overall management and perception of cannibalization vary 
widely. Within specific aircraft platforms, the practice also differs in types of components 
cannibalized, frequency, and the different drivers of cannibalization in the platform 
community (General Accounting Office, 2001). 
The MV-22 community is one of several that practices cannibalization. As one of 
the newest aircraft platforms in the Department of Defense (DOD) inventory, this 
platform competes among the most-frequently cannibalized aircraft platforms in the 
Navy. In 2014, total count of cannibalized parts on this platform was 1,727, ranking it the 
second most cannibalized aircraft in the Marine Corps aircraft inventory after the CH-53 
platform (Naval Air Systems Command 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal communication, 
June 5, 2015).  
2. MV-22 Aircraft Squadrons and Support Activities 
The Marine Corps MV-22 aircraft community continues to grow around this new 
platform. The community is made up of 16 Marine Medium Tiltrotor (VMM) squadrons 
and one Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training (VMMT) fleet replacement squadron (FRS). 
The FRS is the only Marine Corps and Air Force V-22 training unit. It provides aircrew 
and pilot training to personnel in both services. These 17 squadrons are spread throughout 
the four Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW).  
The 1st MAW squadrons include VMMs 262 and 265, which are based in 
Okinawa, Japan. The 2nd MAW squadrons include VMMs 162, 261, 263, 264, 266, 365, 
and VMMT 204, all of which are based at the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New 
River, NC. The 3rd MAW squadrons include VMMs 161, 163, 165, 166, 268, and 363, 
which are based in MCAS Miramar, CA. VMM-764 is a reserve squadron for the 4th 
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MAW and is also based in MCAS Miramar, CA. Two non-operational squadrons, Marine 
Test and Operational Evaluation Squadron 22 and Marine Helicopter Squadron One, also 
have MV-22 aircraft in their aircraft inventory (USMC, 2015). 
Each aircraft location is supported by a Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
(MALS). MALS 36, 26, 16, and 41 supports the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th MAW squadrons 
respectively with supply logistics and Intermediate Level (I-Level) maintenance support 
capability. MALS 26 is a V-22-specific supporting MALS, while MALS 16, 36, and 41 
remain composite MALS, providing support for all aircraft platforms in their Marine 
Aircraft Groups (MAG). With MALS 26 being the V-22’s first and only V-22 unique-
supporting MALS, resident expertise of some I-Level capabilities resides in this MALS, 
which is able to provide support to the other MALS when required. Additionally, each of 
the aircraft locations has an Osprey Support Center staffed with Bell Boeing and Rolls 
Royce fleet support representatives (FSR). These FSRs provide engineering and technical 
support on aircraft and associated support equipment as required. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis focuses on the following research questions: 
Primary Question: How do cannibalization practices vary across 
squadrons? 
Secondary Questions: What are the drivers of cannibalization in the MV-
22 community, and how much does that vary across time and between 
squadrons? How does cannibalization affect availability and how much 
does that vary across time and between squadrons? 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review focuses on cannibalization as a general term and how this 
term is used in the context of the military, specifically the naval aviation community. 
Special consideration was paid to the MV-22 aircraft platform and community to explain 
how the practice and policies surrounding cannibalization applies across the naval 
aviation aircraft fleet. The review gathered existing literature on four areas of 
cannibalization to provide the reader with a broad understanding of reasons for and 
impacts of cannibalization, specifically potential problems and issues. 
Literature was accessed and obtained through the Naval Postgraduate School 
Dudley Knox Library to include research publications, directives, and existing 
cannibalization and cannibalization related information. 
A. CANNIBALIZATION 
Different branches of the military have and create unique definitions of 
cannibalization. The Army regulation 750-1 defines cannibalization as the “authorized 
removal of components from materiel designated for disposal” (Department of the Army, 
2013, p. 45). The Navy’s OPNAVINST 4440.19 defines cannibalization as “the removal 
of serviceable material or components from installed equipment for installation in other 
equipment to restore the latter to an operational condition” (Department of the Navy, 
2012, p. 1). The Air Force’s AFI 21-101 defines cannibalization as “the authorized 
removal of a specific assembly, subassembly, or part from one weapon system, system, 
support system, or equipment end item for installation on another end item to satisfy an 
existing supply requisition and to meet priority mission requirements with an obligation 
to replace the removed item” (Department of the Air Force, 2011, p. 242). 
The cannibalization process can be applied to equipment of all sizes; this ranges 
from small components, with removable sub-assemblies, to larger equipment such as 
automotive, aircraft, and vessels. In Cannibalization Policies for a Set of Parallel 
Machines, Ormon and Cassady (2004) state: “Cannibalization actions are used in many 
 6
high-tech manufacturing environments due to the high cost of spare parts and the need for 
short maintenance turnarounds” (p. 540). 
Cannibalization, in the context of naval aviation, assumes the same process of 
physically removing one component from an aircraft and installing it in another aircraft, 
with the objective of creating an additional mission-capable aircraft. As explained by 
Danny Kowalski (2000), aircraft squadrons practice this form of maintenance in an effort 
to ensure a maximum number of aircraft remain or stay in a mission capable state. This 
allows squadrons to have enough available aircraft to support their daily sortie 
requirements. 
B. CANNIBALIZATION POLICY 
The NAMP, Commander Naval Air Forces Instruction 
(COMNAVAIROFRINST) 4790.2B sets cannibalization policy for naval aviation 
squadrons. The NAMP recognizes cannibalization as a viable short-term solution for 
operational squadrons to overcome maintenance or logistical failures. Chapter 5.1.1.11.1 
states that “Cannibalization, with few exceptions, is a manifestation of a gap in logistics 
or maintenance support systems” (Department of the Navy, 2013, p. 5-23). Squadron 
commanders at the operational level are given this authority to use cannibalizations in 
moderation. This helps them manage their available assets in an effort to minimize the 
impact of a supply system constraint on the aircraft unit’s primary mission: flying. 
The NAMP provides specific guidance to commanders, aircraft maintenance 
officers, and maintenance material control officers (MMCO) on the proper use of 
cannibalization. Aviation ground officers and maintenance officers receive classroom 
instruction on cannibalization during their NAMP indoctrination course of their military 
occupational specialty school before they assume duties in their operational squadrons. 
The NAMP recognizes the importance of properly managing cannibalizations at 
the operational level. It stresses the elimination of unnecessary cannibalization as a direct 
responsibility of logistics and maintenance operations. In this light, Chapter 5.1.1.11.12 
states: “Under no circumstance shall cannibalization be performed to create a pool of 
Ready for Issue (RFI) parts for general use to support flight operations or detachments” 
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(Department of the Navy, 2013, p. 5-23). This verbiage restricts cannibalization of naval 
aviation aircraft parts and components only for returning a not mission capable (NMC) 
aircraft to flight status. 
Chapter 5.1.1.11.12 of the NAMP provides aviation squadron commanders with 
specific cannibalization guidance: 
To pursue courses of action to manage cannibalization properly within 
their areas of purview.  
Assess the effectiveness of their cannibalization policy by using outcome 
measurements, such as supply material availability, A-799 (malfunction 
could not be duplicated) rate, I-level TAT, point of entry effectiveness, 
supply response time, cannibalizations per 100 flight hours, and 
maintenance man-hours per cannibalization.  
Cannibalization on ejection seat systems shall be minimized due to the 
inherent potential to impact safety.  
Cannibalization from Awaiting Parts (AWP) assets is a recognized tool for 
reducing the total number of AWP equipment, but must be carefully 
managed and documented. 
Monitor and report cannibalization actions between squadron aircraft per 
Type Wing/Air Wing instructions. (Department of the Navy, 2013, p. 5-
23) 
The NAMP gives only squadron commanders cannibalization authority over 
aircraft under their cognizance. This allows any unit commander the latitude to 
moderately move specific aircraft parts and components within his or her own unit-
assigned aircraft without a need for higher approval, unless specifically dictated in the 
NAMP guidance (Department of the Navy, 2013). 
Type Wing/Air Wing commanders retain the sole authority for inter-squadron 
cannibalizations as detailed in the NAMP (Department of the Navy, 2013). This policy 
requires unit commanders seeking to cannibalize parts from another unit’s aircraft to 
submit a written justification to their respective wing commander for approval prior to 
proceeding with the cannibalization action. Requirements for the written request typically 
include the supply systems stock posture for the part or component required, the status of 
the outstanding requisition in the supply system, and the anticipated effect of the 
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cannibalization on the operational readiness of both the supplying and receiving 
squadrons. Once the wing commander is convinced through the justification that the 
cannibalization action is warranted, a naval message addressing all parties involved is 
drafted and released directing the cannibalization action (Department of the Navy, 2013). 
The intent of the naval message is to formally address the cannibalization action through 
the aircraft Type Model Series (T/M/S) hierarchy to allow proper tracking of the 
component being cannibalized and the replacement requisition in the supply system. This 
also affords the specific T/M/S logisticians and reliability groups to address broader 
issues of supply and component reliability that might have led to the cannibalization 
action.  
T/M/S Type Commanders (TYCOM) retain the sole authority for approving 
cannibalization requests between Air Wings or Marine Aircraft Groups (MAG), and from 
any aircraft that has been NMC for more than 120 days. Cannibalization requests of this 
type are generated by naval message from the squadron level through the MAG or Wing 
to the TYCOM for approval. Once approved, the TYCOM directs the cannibalization 
action through naval message with related instructions to the supporting supply support 
activities on how to handle the transfer of the component (Department of the Navy, 
2013). Operational, test, and training activities request cannibalization approval from 
separate authorities at the T/M/S level. These activities request approval from the 
Commander Naval Air Forces, Commander Naval Air Systems Command, and Chief of 
Naval Air Training respectively for their squadrons (Department of the Navy, 2013). 
Additional supplemental policies to the NAMP can also be generated by Air Wing 
Commanders in an effort to control cannibalization across squadrons under their 
cognizance. Squadron commanders are required to report any in reporting (IR) status 
aircraft that has remained NMC for 60 days as long term down (LTD) aircraft on the 
Navy’s Aircraft Maintenance and Supply Readiness Report (AMRR). Aircraft 
undergoing periodic maintenance inspections (PMI), rework, or planner and estimator 
repairs are also reported as out of reporting (OOR) on the AMSRR. Wing commanders 
generate local wing policies to govern cannibalization from these categories of aircraft. 
This prevents prolonging aircraft in a LTD/OOR status due to continuous cannibalization. 
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The 2nd MAW LTD order directs squadron maintenance officers to submit a 
cannibalization request to the Wing Aviation Logistics Department prior to cannibalizing 
from a LTD or OOR aircraft (Commanding General, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, 2008). 
This Wing Order also directs squadron maintenance officers to “provide the chain of 
command a Return to Flight Status brief that includes a recovery plan that optimizes 
available resources and ensures that the cannibalization of aircraft components is held to 
a minimum” (Commanding General 2dMAW, 2008, p. 3). 
C. IMPACTS OF CANNIBALIZATION 
Cannibalization of aircraft parts can have significant negative impacts on a unit’s 
aircraft assets and the maintenance personnel performing the cannibalization actions. A 
United States Government Accounting Office (GAO) (2001) study among the different 
services revealed some of the impacts of cannibalization on individual squadrons and 
their personnel. This GAO report on Cannibalizations Adversely Affect Personnel and 
Maintenance stated that “Cannibalizations are done to meet operational and readiness 
needs but they come at a high cost. Cannibalizations have increased the workload of 
maintenance personnel by millions of hours since fiscal year 1996” (General Accounting 
Office, 2001, p. 6). Jimmie S. Griffea also stated in his research on Causes of EA6B 
cannibalizations that “cannibalizations double the work of maintenance personnel, due to 
switching parts with other aircraft” (1998, p. 49). When a decision is made at the unit 
level to cannibalize a part, maintenance personnel are obligated to exhaust twice the 
amount of maintenance man hours (MMH) that would have been required to return the 
original aircraft back to mission capable status. An example scenario to illustrate this 
increase in workload follows: 
Aircraft 08 returns from flight with a maintenance discrepancy that 
requires troubleshooting. Subsequent maintenance troubleshooting reveals 
a faulty control box that needs to be removed and replaced. A supply 
system stock check reveals that control box is not in stock at the local 
supply warehouse. Since Aircraft 08’s return to flight is critical in meeting 
the unit’s flight schedule, a decision is made to cannibalize the control box 
from Aircraft 09. The total MMH required to remove and replace the 
control box is five hours. Maintenance personnel remove the control box 
from Aircraft 09 and install it on Aircraft 08, successfully returning 
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Aircraft 08 to mission capable status. At the end of the process, Aircraft 
08 consumed a total of five maintenance hours for the removal and 
replacement of the control box. Aircraft 09 separately consumed 2.5 hours 
during the cannibalization of the control box and is awaiting parts from 
supply for a new control box that would require an additional 2.5 hours for 
installation once received. Total additional MMHs incurred due to the 
cannibalization action is five hours. 
Another impact of cannibalization is the extended loss of use of a major 
expensive asset. As the GAO study stated, “Cannibalizations takes expensive aircraft out 
of service, sometimes for long periods of time” (General Accounting Office, 2001, p. 2). 
Parts and components that are cannibalized from aircraft are of varying sizes and 
fluctuate in the workload required to remove them. Some aircraft parts like consumable 
hardware are fairly easy to remove and install, requiring minimal manpower, while others 
like an engine or major drive system component commands an ample workload to 
remove. Additionally, removing major components for cannibalization most often will 
require maintenance personnel to remove other components before they can gain access 
to the part that needs to be cannibalized, a process known as a removal to facilitate other 
maintenance (FOM) in naval aviation (Department of the Navy, 2013). Once all these 
removed to FOM components are uninstalled, they often sit on parts shelves or bins 
awaiting the replacement for the cannibalized part to arrive from the supply system. 
Depending on the supply lead time of the cannibalized part, an aircraft can be in 
AWP status for days, weeks, or in some cases months due to gaps in the logistics system. 
The 3 June 2015 V-22 AMSRR revealed several outstanding supply documents, some of 
which had been on order in the supply system for months and in some cases over a year 
(AMSRR 2015). This can make it easier for maintenance managers to cannibalize 
additional parts for other aircraft if required. The ongoing process of continuously 
cannibalizing parts from the same aircraft resets if not properly controlled, and will keep 
an aircraft consistently waiting for parts, eventually turning it into a LTD aircraft. 
Multiple aircraft parts on order can be very difficult to track and control. When an 
aircraft’s multiple outstanding supply documents are not being diligently tracked by 
maintenance officers, it can easily create a recipe for missing parts that can hold the 
aircraft in a LTD status for even longer periods. The GAO cannibalization study in 2001 
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revealed an aircraft that had not flown in more than 300 days due to missing 111 parts as 
a result of uncontrolled cannibalization. Four other aircraft were also identified that had 
not flown for periods ranging from 903 to 1,756 days due to uncontrolled cannibalization 
(General Accounting Office, 2001). Multi-million dollar LTD aircraft like these are often 
referred to as “hangar queens” or “wind chimes” among maintainers and often become 
the lowest priority on a maintenance department’s workload (General Accounting Office, 
2001). 
An aircraft’s complexity coupled with a maintenance department’s capacity 
management issues can significantly contribute to the LTD status of an aircraft. 
Additionally, inaccurate maintenance data inputted into the maintenance data systems 
creates issues of data integrity, causing supply asset visibility and tracking to be a very 
demanding process. The most visible consequence of all these is the hangar queen. 
Although not as common in today’s naval aviation, hangar queen aircraft still 
exist in some aircraft platforms. In reviewing the 3 June 2015 V-22 AMSRR, two MV-22 
aircraft were identified that had not flown since 2008. Both aircraft were AWP for 
varying repairable and consumable parts, the majority of which are V-22 major and 
critical components. A supply document number count revealed a combined 59 
outstanding requisition document numbers, some of which are estimated to be received in 
2017 (AMSRR, 2015). Figure 1 is a picture of MV-22 Bureau Number 166488, one of 
the two cannibalized MV-22 aircraft. This picture was captured by the researcher while 
he was stationed at MCAS New River.  
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Figure 1.  Cannibalized MV-22 Aircraft Bureau Number 166488. 
 
 
Due to the unrealistic and unpredictable demands that aircraft maintenance can 
place on maintenance personnel, a cannibalization action can be required day or night to 
meet operational demands. This means that personnel might be required to work 
additional hours until the part being cannibalized is removed and installed into the second 
aircraft to get it operationally ready for the flight schedule. Jacobs (2003) explained in his 
research on E-2C aircraft cannibalization that the idea of using cannibalization to return a 
NMC aircraft to mission capable status can make it very profitable for maintainers to 
cannibalize—even on late Fridays and weekends—even if the aircraft is not required for 
the next day’s schedule. 
As mentioned, the NAMP recognizes the many impacts of cannibalization, one of 
which is the negative impact on morale of maintenance personnel. Chapter 5.1.2.10.1 
states “Cannibalization has a tendency to adversely impact morale and to worsen the 
NMCS or PMCS situation which it theoretically is intended to overcome” (Department of 
the Navy, 2013, p. 5-33). Maintenance personnel are salaried and do not accumulate any 
additional pay or incentives for working overtime. Any maintenance task that tends to 
take them past their normal work shift can be viewed as working without pay, reducing 
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the morale of the maintenance personnel. This view on reduced morale was reinforced by 
the Naval Inspector General when he stated in a GAO report that “cannibalization is 
counterproductive and has a huge impact on morale” (General Accounting Office, 2001, 
p. 8). This reduced morale of the unit personnel over time adversely affects overall unit 
readiness due to decreased productivity in a maintenance department. 
Cannibalization due to unavailable parts affects overall personnel retention in the 
DOD. A GAO survey conducted on the retention of officer and enlisted personnel in 
critical specialties ranked the availability of needed equipment, parts, and materials as the 
number one and number two reasons respectively why officers and enlisted personnel left 
the military service (General Accounting Office, 1999). 
D. REASONS WHY SQUADRONS CANNIBALIZE 
Squadrons cannibalize parts based on their individual needs. This section provides 
four main reasons why naval aviation squadrons practice cannibalization.  
1. Supply System Shortages 
DOD squadrons cannibalize parts for a variety of different reasons, the most 
common of which is a supply shortage of the required part. Jacobs (2000) again stated in 
his E-2C cannibalization research that “the first and probably most obvious reason for 
squadron-level cannibalization is a material shortage where the local supply system does 
not have a replacement asset” (p. 24). Production delays, manufacturer repair delays, 
component reliability, and aging aircraft airframes are just a few reasons why part 
shortages can arise. When a required part needed for replacement is not readily available 
at the local supply, maintenance managers have to make a quick decision on how to get 
the NMC aircraft back to a flying status. 
As also revealed in the GAO-02-86 report on cannibalization, service officials 
also believe the main reason for cannibalizations was the shortage of spare repair parts 
(General Accounting Office, 2001). This often results in a decision to cannibalize the 
component from another aircraft and replace it once the supply system is able to yield the 
needed part. Depending on what part is required and the supply system’s availability 
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stock posture, these high-priority part requisitions can be on order in the supply system 
for days or even months for some limited aircraft parts. The April 2015 V-22 Supply 
System Working Group report revealed 91 supply requisition document numbers that had 
been on order for greater than 365 days. These document numbers accounted for a total 
of 231 parts ordered against 49 MV-22 airframes in operational squadrons (V-22 SSWG, 
2015). 
2. High Operational Tempo 
The GAO explained in their study on cannibalization that high-unit operational 
tempo places heavy pressure on the supply system to be able to provide needed parts 
immediately when needed (General Accounting Office, 2001). When aircraft squadrons 
sporadically increase their daily operational requirements, the number of flying hours 
flown on aircraft increase causing a corresponding increase in the number of aircraft 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance required. As Retzlaff and DeSilva (2005) stated 
in Achieving maximum unit mission capability, “Availability is directly dependent on the 
level of OPTEMPO, especially in older weapon systems. This means as OPTEMPO 
increases, availability will decrease as systems reach their point of required maintenance 
and logistical support quicker” (p. 6). 
To complete aircraft scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, parts are needed. 
As the frequency of these maintenance requirements increases, so does the demand for its 
associated part requirements. These additional increases in part requirements at the 
squadron level create an irregular demand on a supply system and can quickly deplete in-
stock items in the supply warehouse. As stated by Torres in Supportability Requirements 
for the V-22 Osprey, “When parts allowances are set and fleet requests exceed 200 
percent or greater of the initial allowance, it creates a ripple effect in support” (2005, p. 
27). Aviation logistics squadrons stock their posture on historical demand forecasts and 
sporadic increases in operational tempo among different squadrons makes it difficult to 
satisfy immediate part requirements and often leads to stock outs. Maintenance managers 
are therefore left with an only option of cannibalizing the part required. 
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3. High Readiness Demands 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has established aircraft readiness goals for 
all aircraft platforms in the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE). Readiness goals are 
established in two categories; mission capable (MC) and full mission capable (FMC) 
rates. The NAMP publishes the overall NAE readiness goal as 73% MC and 56% FMC 
(Department of the Navy, 2013). Each specific aircraft T/M/S has its own assigned 
readiness goals as stated in the applicable T/M/S Mission Essential Subsystem Matrix 
(MESM). 
As explained in Chapter 17 of the NAMP, “An aircraft unit’s MC rate reflects the 
percentage of all aircraft assigned to the unit which are capable of performing at least 
one, but not all missions published in the MESM, while the FMC rate reflects the 
percentage of all aircraft assigned which are capable of performing all missions outlined 
in the MESM” (Department of the Navy, 2013, p. 17-19). Table 1 provides an example 
list of CNO readiness goals for the various operational T/M/S aircraft assigned to 
2dMAW: 
Table 1.   Second MAW Aircraft CNO Readiness Goals. 
Adapted from: Commanding General, 2nd MAW. (2012 January 9). Aircraft readiness 
requirements. Cherry Point, NC: United States Marine Corps. Retrieved from 
http://www.2ndmaw.,arines.mil/Portals/7/WingAdjutatn/Order/WgO%203501.4E.pdf 
Aircraft squadrons are required to report their specific unit’s readiness daily 
through the Navy’s AMSRR website to show their current state of aircraft readiness. This 
T/M/S MC (%) FMC (%) T/M/S MC (%) FMC (%) 
EA6B 73 54 CH53E 70 60 
KC130J 81 70 FA18A 75 58 
UH1N 85 75 FA18C 75 58 
UH1Y 85 75 FA18D 75 58 
AH1W 85 75 AV8B 76 68 
AH1Z 85 75 MV-22B 82 75 
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report once published by the unit becomes visible to all higher echelons up to CNO level. 
Aircraft maintenance managers take pride in readiness reporting since it is looked at as a 
measure of the effectiveness of the unit’s maintenance management. Multiple aircraft that 
are AWP lowers a unit’s MC and FMC rate and can cause them to fall below the CNO 
goal. As Myette (1981) stated in his research on Cannibalization of the F-14A and S-3A 
aircraft, “Squadron level maintenance managers consolidate unfilled supply requirements 
to as few aircraft as possible in order to maximize readiness” (p. 49). Aviation squadrons 
still use cannibalization to consolidate the number of aircraft that are AWP in an effort to 
create more flyable aircraft thereby increasing their mission capable rating. The daily 
readiness reporting demands keep every aircraft unit’s maintenance department focused 
on high readiness to avoid any undue attention and scrutiny from their higher-ranked 
commanders. 
4. Supply Response Time 
Similar to aircraft squadron operations, the CNO has established acceptable 
standards for aviation logistics supply units for delivering aircraft parts to the aircraft 
squadrons. Supply units have a designated response time to issue local in-stock parts to 
the requisitioning unit or to provide the unit with an accurate requisition status for items 
that are not locally available. This includes not in stock (NIS) and not carried (NC) parts 
(Department of the Navy, 2013). 
 A requisition response time begins when the squadron unit places an order for a 
part on the supply system and ends when the part is delivered to the requesting unit. 
Response times vary based on the issue priority group of the part and the priority 
designator (PD) of the unit. Table 2 shows the NAMP’s published supply response times 





Table 2.   Supply Response Time for Aviation Supply Squadrons. 
Issue Priority Group  Priority Designator  Processing Time  
1 1–2 1 Hour 
2 4–8 2 Hours 
3 9–15 24 Hours 
Adapted from: Department of the Navy. (2013 Jun 15). The Naval aviation maintenance 
program. Patuxent River, MD: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/logistics/4790/library/contents.pdf 
A parts-issue priority group is based on the parts’ impact on the mission 
capability of the aircraft. Parts that cause an aircraft to be NMC are assigned Priority 1, 
those that affect the FMC status of the aircraft are assigned Priority 2, and routine parts 
that do not impair the aircraft’s ability to fly or perform any specific mission are issued a 
Priority 3. A unit’s priority designator is determined by the force or activity designator 
(FAD) assigned to the unit and the urgency of need designator (UND) for the unit. 
(Deputy Under Secretary of Defense [L&MR], 2003). 
Supply response time can be a major deciding factor for maintenance managers 
when it comes to cannibalizing an aircraft part. When a Priority 1 part is required from 
supply for a NMC aircraft to make a scheduled launch, maintenance managers have to 
make decisions on the total timeframe for repairs to be completed on the aircraft. If the 
supply response time appears to be greater than 30 minutes to receive the part, the 
scheduled launch has a high chance of getting aborted due to the repair delay. As Jacobs 
stated in his research, “A replacement component that takes more than 30 minutes to 
deliver is of little use to a maintenance manager for that launch” (2000, p. 26). This 
realization that the aircraft might not make the scheduled launch often leads to a 
cannibalization decision to quickly remove the part from another aircraft for quick 
installation to reduce the total repair time for the NMC aircraft. This allows the NMC 
aircraft to make the scheduled launch, and the replacement part from supply to be 
installed in the cannibalized aircraft at a later time. Appendix E of the NAMP directs a 
maintenance data system Malfunction Code of 814 to be used for documenting 
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cannibalization actions taken as a result of a time constraint to make a scheduled launch 
or to complete a turnaround inspection for an aircraft (Department of the Navy, 2013). 
E. SUMMARY 
The NAMP acknowledges the issue of supply constraints in the naval aviation 
community and has established policies on the use of cannibalization as a viable 
technique to allow squadrons to minimize the impact of the supply constraint on their 
aircraft readiness. This practice enables maintenance managers to systematically 
orchestrate moving parts between aircrafts to manage their MC and NMC assets. 
Although aviation squadrons cannibalize for a variety of reasons to include (but 
are not limited to) supply system shortages, supply response time, high operational 
tempo, and high readiness demands, the negative impacts of cannibalization can be quite 
adverse to the aviation squadrons and the DOD as a whole. Excessive MMHs are 
exhausted during cannibalization, which significantly contributes to reduced personnel 
morale and personnel retention in the DOD. Aircraft assets are also taken out of service 





This chapter explains how the data used in the analysis was collected and 
analyzed to answer the research questions stated in Chapter I. The data sources section 
provides the sources of the data used in the thesis. The research design strategy section 
describes how the data to be presented in Chapter IV was organized and analyzed. The 
measures of cannibalization section describes how the Navy measures cannibalization in 
the naval aviation community. Lastly, the research scope and limitations section explains 
the specific aspects of the MV-22 cannibalizations that were or were not considered in 
this research. It also identifies the MV-22 squadrons in the community that were analyzed 
in this research. 
A. DATA SOURCES 
The data used in this research was sourced from a variety of different naval 
aviation maintenance data sources.  
Five years of historical MV-22 aircraft cannibalization data from January 2010 to 
January 2015 was received from two different system analysts; the Commander Naval 
Air Forces Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC) systems analyst, and the MV-22 platform 
systems analyst. The data was sourced from these two locations to allow the researcher to 
compare and contrast the two sets of data and ensure accuracy of the data being received. 
This data contained all cannibalization work order information for the five year period. 
The VMMT-204 maintenance department provided a January 2015 combined 
maintenance and material management (3M) summary report for the 2dMAW VMM 
squadrons. This report included summary maintenance information for all squadrons that 
were on station and not deployed during the month of January 2015. 
A consolidated matrix report of aviation maintenance and supply readiness 
reporting (AMSRR) and 3M data from 2013 to 2015 for all community wide MV-22 
squadrons was obtained from the MV-22 Current Readiness Analyst aboard MCAS New 
River. This report contained all pertinent monthly AMSRR readiness information and 3M 
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monthly maintenance summary report information for all the MAG 16 and MAG 26 
VMM squadrons. 
The COMNAVAIRPAC database systems analyst provided the historical MV-22 
flight summary data from January 2010 to January 2015. This report contained monthly 
flight hour and flight sortie information for all the MV-22 squadrons.  
A data set containing 2010 to 2015 historical MV-22 aircraft inventory counts and 
yearly count of all in reporting (IR) status aircraft in the community was sourced and 
received from the COMNAVAIRPAC database systems analyst.  
MV-22 deployment maintenance data from 2011 to 2013 was acquired from the 
MV-22 database system analyst. This data contained MV-22 land-based and shipboard 
deployment maintenance data for seven selected squadrons that deployed during that 
timeframe.  
B. RESEARCH DESIGN STRATEGY 
This research uses an inductive approach to identify trends, patterns and 
differences in the practice of cannibalization between squadrons and over time. In this 
context, an inductive approach means there were no specific hypotheses the researcher 
intended to test. Instead, an analysis of the data was undertaken to better understand 
potential problem areas and potential avenues for improvement. 
The researcher’s existing knowledge and experience on the topic of aircraft 
cannibalization was heavily relied upon in analyzing the data and understanding the 
different aspects of the various maintenance work order codes, MV-22 aircraft 
components, and general MV-22 maintenance and flight operational concepts. This 
knowledge and experience stemmed from 10 years of being an aircraft mechanic and five 
years of experience as an MV-22 maintenance officer. 
The five year historical work order data received was organized using Microsoft 
Excel pivot tables. This allowed for the selection of specific MV-22 squadrons and 
cannibalization pertinent work order information required for the analysis. The pertinent 
work order information retrieved included: The cannibalization reason codes; the 
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maintenance man hours (MMH) documented, repairable and consumable information; the 
component part number and nomenclature information, and the equipment operational 
capability (EOC) codes. This information was then sorted by squadron and by time 
frames and used as factors to compare the different squadrons. The cannibalized 
component data was also sorted into yearly frequency distributions to identify the top 
frequently cannibalized components across the community. 
A between-squadron comparison of cannibalization rates, as measured by the 
Navy, was also conducted. Using this rate and the total number of cannibalizations as 
performance metrics, the researcher was able to identify which squadrons performed 
better at cannibalization.in relation to their number of flight hours flown over a given 
period. This also enabled the researcher to identify if any relationship existed between 
cannibalizations and the number of flight hours flown.  
A total of seven squadrons were selected for cannibalization by deployment 
analysis. The purpose of the analysis was to compare how the practice of cannibalizations 
varied between squadrons on their deployments and between two types of deployment. 
The two types of deployments were land-based and shipboard deployments. This was 
accomplished by breaking the seven squadrons into the two deployment categories based 
on when the applicable deployment was completed. The researcher was able to determine 
how the practice of cannibalizations varied with deployments using these measurement 
parameters.   
Most of the data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics, frequency 
charts, scatter plots, and ratio/percentage analysis. Utilizing these tools, the researcher 
was able to establish patterns and variations in cannibalization among the different 
squadrons, and also analyze the squadron performance on a cannibalization rate basis.  
In Chapter IV, descriptive statistics will be used to compare squadrons' 
performance based on historical data. One squadron (or group of squadrons) will be said 
to be ‘better’ than another on the basis of this historical data. No inferential statistics will 
be applied to support this comparison. In other words, the analysis will describe the 
relative differences between squadrons, and not attempt to predict how much of that 
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difference might have been due to chance alone. In some cases, the magnitude of the 
differences will make it clear that there are assignable causes to the variation. In others, 
this attribution may be less well justified. Hence, when the results indicate one squadron 
or group of squadrons is ‘better’ than another on any metric, the reader will understand 
this to mean ‘historically better in this data,’ and not to contain any inference about the 
likelihood of the difference occurring due to chance alone. However, in many cases, this 
researcher will attempt to examine the data in detail, to uncover the historical reasons for 
the performance differences from the qualitative data describing what occurred. 
In analyzing the secondary research questions, however, inferential statistics will 
be used. Secondary question number two required the researcher to determine how 
cannibalization affected aircraft availability in the different squadrons. To answer this 
question, a multivariate regression analysis was performed using the consolidated 
AMSRR and 3M data. This regression was performed using the Data Analysis tool pack 
in Microsoft Excel, and inferences were made about the regression results.  
C. MEASURES OF CANNIBALIZATION 
Naval aviation cannibalization is measured in one of two ways: The number of 
cannibalization actions per every 100 flight hours flown, or the number of cannibalization 
actions per every 100 flight sorties (Department of the Navy, 2013). A single 
cannibalization action can be related to the removal of a serviceable component or part 
from an aircraft. As a standard practice, most squadrons use the cannibalization per 
hundred flight hour matrix to measure their cannibalization rates. Chapter 14.2.2.1.5k of 
COMNAVAIROFRINST 4790.2B defines and displays this form of measurement as 
shown in Figure 2: 
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Figure 2.  Cannibalization Rates. 
 CANNS/100 FLTHRS: Measures the number of cannibalization actions 
 necessary to support 100 flight hours. This use of 100 flight hours, as a 
 standard divisor, is to normalize comparisons and maintain statistical 
 consistency. Computation of this data element is as follows:  
 
 CANNS / 100 FLTHRS = TOTAL CANN ITEMS  
                                 (TOTAL FLTHRS / 100) 
Source: Department of the Navy. (2013 Jun 15). The Naval aviation maintenance 
program (COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2B CH-1). Washington, DC: Headquarters 
Department of the Navy. 
The NAMP has also established a requirement for aviation maintenance 
squadrons to publish their cannibalization rates in their monthly 3M summary report. 
Figure 3 is a sample page of VMM-162’s January 2015 Monthly 3M cannibalization 
summary report briefed to the MAG 26 commander. 
Figure 3.  VMM-162 January 2015 3M Cannibalization Summary. 
 
Source: Eggert, N. (2015, January). Marine Aircraft Group 26 January 2015 3M 
Summary. Paper presented at Marine Aircraft Group 26, Jacksonville, NC. 
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D. RESEARCH SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The purpose of this analysis is to perform a comparative and time series analysis 
of cannibalization in the MV-22 community. This research will analyze cannibalization 
practices and trends between squadrons over time to determine how the overall process of 
cannibalization contributes to aircraft availability within the squadrons. 
MV-22 squadrons analyzed included training and operational squadrons within 
the first, second and third MAWs. All squadrons that were selected for the analysis had 
fully transitioned to the MV-22 aircraft as of January 2015. Individual squadrons selected 
were VMMs 162,261,263,264,266,365, and VMMT-204 on the East Coast, and VMMs 
161,163,165,166,268, and 363 on the West Coast. 
This analysis excluded new squadrons that were still going through the MV-22 
transition due to the lack of historical maintenance information to be able to fairly 
benchmark them against other established squadrons. Squadrons involved in operational 
testing and evaluation, special operational mission sets, and operating in a reserve status 
were also excluded in the comparative analysis.  
This research only analyzed the squadrons under specific areas of cannibalization: 
Unit cannibalizations by malfunction reason code were explored to identify the various 
reason codes that squadrons were documenting. MMH documented by the different 
squadrons was also analyzed to see how the squadrons varied in the amount of MMHs 
exhausted for cannibalization actions. Components that were cannibalized were analyzed 
under the repairable and consumable categories to see how squadrons differed in 
cannibalizing components between the two categories. Cannibalizations by EOC code 
was also analyzed to identify which major EOC categories consumed the most of 
cannibalization tasks and to identify how that varied between the squadrons.  
This research on MV-22 cannibalization was only limited to the analysis of 
cannibalization rates and MMH expended based on the factors previously described. 
Other aspects of cannibalization that are not addressed by this research include: 
 The problems surrounding the logistical constraints of the naval aviation 
supply system that creates AWP situations. This was beyond the scope of 
this research.  
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 The negative impact of cannibalization on personnel morale in the MV-22 
community. 
 The long-term impacts of component cannibalizations on aircrafts. 
During the aforementioned data gathering process, the researcher was able to 
engage in a number of background discussions with V-22 maintenance personnel and 
SMEs. From those conversations, the researcher was able to develop a list of 
recommended best cannibalization practices. While this list is not within the scope of the 
researcher’s scientific investigation, the researcher nonetheless wanted to document the 
recommendations. This list of recommendations can be found in the Appendix.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the research methodology used in Chapter IV of the thesis. 
The type and sources of the data used in the thesis was explained in detail, along with the 
research design strategy used in analyzing the data. The tools, methods and specific V-22 
squadrons included in the analysis were formally identified to set the stage for the next 
chapter. This chapter also explained the Navy’s current method of measuring 
cannibalization and how this method was used in this thesis to identify which squadrons 
performed better at cannibalization in the community. Lastly, the scope and limitations of 
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents and analyzes the data obtained using the data collection 
methods mentioned in Chapter III. MV-22 aircraft cannibalization data from 2010 to 
2015 was received and analyzed to determine if there was a difference in the practice of 
cannibalization between the different squadrons. Throughout the five year period, the 
MV-22 aircraft community was still in transition as existing CH-46 aircraft squadrons 
progressively transitioned to the MV-22 aircraft, and was taken into consideration while 
performing the analysis. 
A. ANALYZING DIFFERENCES IN CANNIBALIZATION PRACTICES 
In an attempt to determine how cannibalization varies across squadrons, the 
researcher considered six categories: 
 Cannibalizations by malfunction reason code 
 Cannibalization maintenance man hours documented 
 Cannibalization by repairable to consumable part ratio 
 Cannibalization by equipment operational capability codes 
 Cannibalizations per 100 flight hours 
 Cannibalizations on deployment and by deployment type 
1. Cannibalizations by Malfunction Reason Code 
COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2B Change 1 has established maintenance data 
system malfunction codes to be used by aviation squadrons when documenting 
maintenance actions performed. Maintenance actions that involve cannibalization of 
components are documented using one of the seven cannibalization malfunction codes: 
812: Cannibalization—removed for fault isolation/troubleshooting (unit 
left installed in second aircraft) 
813: Cannibalization—directed by higher authority (above squadron level 
inter-activity transfer of equipment or item) 
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814: Cannibalization—operation launch/turnaround requirements (part not 
readily available within required time constraints) 
815: Cannibalization—repairable part carried but not on hand in local 
supply system 
816: Cannibalization—repairable part not carried in local supply system 
817: Cannibalization—consumable part not carried or not in stock 
818: Cannibalization—lack of available deck space /Support Equipment/ 
test equipment for trouble shooting, unit left installed in second aircraft. 
(Department of the Navy, 2013) 
The five-year maintenance data received was sorted to categorize all 
cannibalization actions performed by the 13 squadrons into the seven cannibalization 
malfunction codes. Each cannibalization work order had one of the accompanying 
malfunction codes documented to indicate the specific reason for the cannibalization 
action. There were no cannibalization work orders that were found without an appropriate 
malfunction code. This was a good indication that the squadrons were in compliance with 
the NAMP and the maintenance information system was accurate in tracking malfunction 
codes; however, it did not guarantee the accuracy of the specific cannibalization 
malfunction code that was imputed on the work order. Table 3 is a depiction and 
breakdown of all cannibalization work orders sorted by reason malfunction codes for the 
seven East Coast squadrons. 
Table 3.   Cannibalization by Reason Malfunction Code for East Coast 
Squadrons. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
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The data revealed that the vast majority of cannibalizations were performed and 
documented under reason code 815, because the local supply department had stocked out 
of those repairable parts. To determine the actual magnitude of the number of items 
processed under these categories, the researcher calculated the number of items processed 
in each category as a percentage of the total items cannibalized for each squadron. Table 
4 shows the different percentages associated with these cannibalization reason codes. 
Table 4.   Reason Code as a Percentage of Total Items Cannibalized for East 
Coast Squadrons. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
The data revealed that 82% to 95% of cannibalizations actions documented were 
associated with the 815 reason code, verifying the impact that parts unavailability has on 
individual squadrons. As discussed in the literature review, this problem does affect 
overall personnel retention in the DOD. 
Reason code 814 (operation launch/turnaround requirements; part not readily 
available within required time constraints) appeared to be the second most common 
reason for cannibalization for all squadrons with the exception of VMMs 261 and 263. 
This reason code is used when cannibalization decisions were made due to a time 
constraint in meeting a launch requirement. To be more specific, the parts required for 
these work orders were on hand at the local supply department but the supply response 
time coupled with the time required to install the component would have delayed or 
scrapped the launch if a cannibalization decision had not been made.  
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For two squadrons, VMM-365 and VMMT-204, fewer than 3% of total items 
cannibalized fell under the 814 code. The two squadrons comparatively are able to 
successfully execute their scheduled launches with minimal cannibalization than the other 
squadrons. Squadrons that have established aircraft launch procedures which allow ample 
troubleshooting time, typically follow this pattern. For these squadrons, when a launch 
aircraft requires troubleshooting to reset or clear a fault discrepancy, the maintainers are 
often given time to isolate and repair the discrepancy to enable the scheduled aircraft to 
make the launch. These squadrons also typically have proficient systems troubleshooters 
that are proficient at resetting aircraft system logics that are able to clear the majority of 
fault indications without the need to replace parts or components. This concept is 
especially critical for a training squadron like VMMT-204 because it allows the squadron 
to manage its daily flight schedule while limiting the number of back-up aircraft that will 
be used if pilots were always allowed to move to another aircraft whenever they had 
faulty indications on start-up.  
Cannibalization directed by higher authority is associated with reason code 813 
(directed by higher authority). Of the seven squadrons, VMM-261 showed the highest in 
this category. While other squadrons ranged from 0% to 5 % of total items in this 
category, VMM-261’s cannibalizations in this category accounted for 10.99% of its 
overall items processed. This squadron comparatively receives more direction by higher 
authority to cannibalize parts and components for other squadrons within or outside the 
MAG. Squadrons that are directed to cannibalize parts for other squadrons do not only 
reduce their own readiness in the process, but also exhausts significant MMHs to remove 
the parts for other squadrons. In the case of VMM-261, the squadron accumulated a 
MMH cost of 339.6 MMHs for cannibalizations in this category. 
Cannibalizations of repairable parts that are not carried in the local supply system 
are documented using a malfunction code of 816. Of the East Coast squadrons, VMM-
162 had the most in this category, even though they had the lowest in overall count of 
parts cannibalized. A total of 23 parts were cannibalized in this category in the five year 
period which was more than double what the two next higher squadrons (VMMs 261 and 
266) had cannibalized. Both squadrons combined documented 18 parts in this category. 
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Work orders documenting the 816 malfunction code were screened to see which specific 
repairable parts were documented as not carried (NC) in the local supply department. The 
majority of part numbers documented as NC were in fact carried by the supply 
department but were not in stock (NIS) at the time VMM-162 placed the orders. NIS 
repairable components are supposed to be documented using 815 malfunction code, 
which should have been the case. However, since the verbiage of the 815 (repairable part 
carried but not on hand in local supply system) and 816 category (repairable part not 
carried in local supply system) almost read the same, maintainers do inadvertently 
document work orders under the 816 code instead of the 815. This error held true for 
most of the 816 work orders screened for the other East Coast squadrons as well.  
Historical cannibalizations by reason code were also screened for the West Coast 
squadrons to compare how they varied with the East Coast squadrons. Table 5 depicts the 
breakdown of cannibalizations by reason code for the six squadrons analyzed on that 
Coast. 
Table 5.   Cannibalization by Reason Malfunction Code for West Coast 
Squadrons. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Squadrons on this Coast generally appeared to follow the same pattern as those on 
the East Coast. Across the seven reason codes, the 815 category was still the category 
with the highest number of removals, still indicating that the majority of items processed 
Squadron Unit 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 Totals
VMM-161 6 6 22 625 19 11 1 690
VMM-163 2 3 23 327 7 1 0 363
VMM-165 5 5 49 227 13 0 0 299
VMM-166 3 36 16 416 3 2 0 476
VMM-268 2 2 12 79 2 0 0 166
VMM-363 1 2 45 131 3 0 1 183
Totals 19 54 167 1805 47 14 2 2177
Cannibalization by Reason Malfunction Codes
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were repairable that were NIS. Table 6 shows the magnitude of each category to the total 
items cannibalized for the different squadrons. 
Table 6.   Reason Code as a Percentage of Total Items Cannibalized for West 
Coast Squadrons. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
VMMs 165 and 363’s overall cannibalized components under the 814 category 
was comparatively higher than the other squadrons. Percentages of overall 814 
cannibalized components in those squadrons were 16.39% and 24.59% respectively, 
while the remaining squadrons ranged from 3% to 7% in this category. These squadrons 
cannibalize more parts than the others in support of turnaround and launch operations to 
accomplish their daily flight schedules requirements. Both of these squadrons are newer 
transitioned squadrons, with the majority of their 814 work orders documented within the 
first few years of transition. The frequency of 814 work orders in both squadrons was 
seen to be declining as time progressed from their transitioning stages. This was 
indicative of the squadron maintainers gaining more technical proficiency, enabling them 
to execute fight operations with minimal cannibalizations as before. 
Similar to the East Coast squadrons, one squadron, VMM-166 appeared to 
cannibalize more parts by direction of higher authority compared to the others. Their 
percentage of items processed under the 813 reason code (directed by higher authority) 
was 7% compared to fewer than 2% for the remaining squadrons. Upon reviewing the 
discrepancy blocks of the historical work orders for these cannibalizations, it was 
discovered that all the work orders were initiated to cannibalize parts to support of the 
 33
Fall 2012 Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Instructor course in Yuma AZ. This 
training event although not a specific squadron driven exercise and away from the 
squadrons home base, still placed a burden on VMM-166 to remove parts from its 
assigned aircraft in support of the event. 
2. Cannibalization by Maintenance Man Hours Documented 
The researcher attempted to identify how MMHs documentation varied across the 
different squadrons. Each of the 13 squadrons were analyzed to see how their total MMH 
documented and total cannibalizations compared to the other squadrons over the five year 
period. Parts and components that are cannibalized expend MMHs to remove and replace 
the item. As such, it was expected that squadrons with higher numbers of total 
cannibalized components would have documented significantly more cannibalization 
MMHs than squadrons with less number of items processed. Table 7 displays the total 
count of cannibalized items and sum of MMH for both East and West Coast squadrons. 
Table 7.   Total Items Cannibalized and Total MMH. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
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Of the East Coast squadrons, VMM-162 cannibalized the least number of items, 
totaling 552 for the five year period. The total MMHs exhausted on these parts were 
3,703 hours which was more than the MMH expended by VMM-263 to cannibalize 635 
items. Conversely, VMMT-204 cannibalized a total of 1,107 parts, leading the other 
squadrons as the squadron with the highest number of cannibalizations. Their total 
documented MMH was 4,914 which were significantly less than what was exhausted by 
VMMs 264 and 266 to cannibalize 295 and 247 less parts respectively. Similar disparities 
among the West Coast squadrons were observed as well. VMM-165 processed a total of 
299 components exhausting 2,669 MMHs, whereas VMM-166 exhausted 2,686 MMHs 
to process 476 parts. Even though 177 more parts were cannibalized inVMM-166 than 
VMM-165, documented MMHs for VMM-166 was less than that documented by VMM-
165. Another squadron VMM-363 cannibalized only 17 more parts than VMM-268. 
These 17 parts however, accounted for a difference of 717 MMHs higher than that of 
VMM-268.  
To understand why there were such significant variations in MMHs documented, 
the researcher took an approach to sample historical work orders for three components to 
see how MMHs were documented for these components in the different squadrons. The 
components selected for comparison were No.2 flight control computer (FCC), control 
display unit (CDU) keyboard, and a No.4 variable frequency generator (VFG) as depicted 
in Table 8. These components were selected based on the simple fact of easy accessibility 
and having no requirement to remove other components to facilitate their removal and 
replacement. 
Each of the work orders examined from the different squadrons displayed huge 
variations in the number of MMHs documented. Per the data examined, MMHs required 
to cannibalization a No. 2 FCC ranges from 0.1 to 10.2 MMHs. Similarly, a CDU 
keyboard required 0.2 to 12.2 hours, while a No. 4 VFG required 0.3 to 15.1 Hours. 
Table 8 displays a sampled list of work orders with their Maintenance Control Numbers 
(MCN) for the three components selected.  
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Table 8.   Historical Documented FCC, CDU Keyboard, and VFG MMHs. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Cannibalization MMHs are only meant to account for the maintenance time 
required to simply remove and replace a component. These documented hours should 
therefore have not included any additional system trouble shooting time or other 
maintenance time not pertaining to the component removal and replacement process. 
Additionally, maintenance instruction manuals also standardize removal and replacement 
Squadron Component Part Number MCN MMH 
VMM-161 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 1ONJ413 2.4 Hours
VMM-162 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 121EIM3 0.7 Hours
VMM-163 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 1P1LNWK 7.2 Hours
VMM-165 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 1MPKLKK 0.1 Hours
VMM-166 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 29Z20E5 1.3 Hours
VMM-261 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 28QOM1Z 0.5 Hours
VMM-263 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 112GNT2 3.1 Hours
VMM-264 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 1GHKJ4P 10.2 Hours
VMM-266 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 148OB24 4.2 Hours
VMM-365 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 2MEXV7U 0.2 Hours
VMM-363 NO.2 Flight Control Computer 901-305-150-111 198CQ9N 0.4 Hours
Squadron Component Part Number MCN MMH 
VMM-161 Computer Display Unit Keyboard 901-370-354-403 1ONIVO3 3.7 Hours
VMM-162 Computer Display Unit Keyboard 901-370-354-403 121EOI3 4.9 Hours
VMM-261 Computer Display Unit Keyboard 901-370-354-403 28QOUCS 0.2 Hours
VMM-264 Computer Display Unit Keyboard 901-370-354-403 1GF93RA 1.4 Hours
VMM-266 Computer Display Unit Keyboard 901-370-354-403 146D9KO 0.3 Hours
VMM-365 Computer Display Unit Keyboard 901-370-354-403 2MEW6OV 1.0 Hours
VMM-363 Computer Display Unit Keyboard 901-370-354-403 198CY1I 9.4 Hours
VMMT-204 Computer Display Unit Keyboard 901-370-354-403 00GFJA1 12.2 Hours
Squadron Component Part Number MCN MMH 
VMM-163 No. 4 Variable Frequency Generator 901-375-002-117 1P1L25W 2.3 Hours
VMM-261 No. 4 Variable Frequency Generator 901-375-002-117 28QOQIB 4.0 hours
VMM-264 No. 4 Variable Frequency Generator 901-375-002-117 1GF957Y 6.9 Hours
VMM-365 No. 4 Variable Frequency Generator 901-375-002-117 2MEW6XV 9.0 Hours
VMM-363 No. 4 Variable Frequency Generator 901-375-002-117 198CQ9I 15.1 Hours
VMMT-204 No. 4 Variable Frequency Generator 901-375-002-117 00GEXT9 0.3 Hours
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steps for these components and should have minimized a lot of the variation in the 
MMHs documented.  
Historical work orders for all the components were retrieved for the five year 
period to run a descriptive statistics on the documented MMHs for each component. 
Table 9 contains the results of the descriptive statistics. 
Table 9.   FCC, CDU Keyboard, and VFG MMH Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Results from the descriptive statistics revealed large standard deviations in 
documenting MMHs for the same components between the different squadrons. Each 
component’s standard deviation was divided by its specific mean to calculate the 
coefficient of variation for the three components. The calculated results using the data 
resulted in coefficient of variations of 1.06, 1.14 and 1.64 for the FCC, CDU keyboard 
and VFG MMHs respectively. These results revealed that the MMHs documented for 
cannibalizing these components vary on average by over 100%, or in the case of the 
VFG, by 164%.  
These variations in MMHs documented, means that cannibalization MMHs 
reported across the community significantly vary. Although the NAMP requires 
Mean 1.9969697 Mean 2.140425532 Mean 2.29230769
Standard Error 0.26943755 Standard Error 0.358479412 Standard Error 0.72576587
Median 1.3 Median 1.4 Median 0.65
Mode 1.2 Mode 0.4 Mode 0.5
Standard Deviation 2.18892103 Standard Deviation 2.457611033 Standard Deviation 3.70069432
Sample Variance 4.79137529 Sample Variance 6.039851989 Sample Variance 13.6951385
Kurtosis 13.5438962 Kurtosis 7.050145108 Kurtosis 5.22021438
Skewness 3.2413808 Skewness 2.558048714 Skewness 2.31897602
Range 13.4 Range 12 Range 15
Minimum 0.1 Minimum 0.2 Minimum 0.1
Maximum 13.5 Maximum 12.2 Maximum 15.1
Sum 131.8 Sum 100.6 Sum 59.6
Count 66 Count 47 Count 26
VFG StatisticsFCC Statistics CDU Keyboard Statistics
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squadrons to publish and submit cannibalization MMHs as part of their monthly 3M 
summaries, these numbers may not accurately reflect how much time is actually 
exhausted to cannibalize parts and components in the community. It appears likely that 
the variance is caused by some degree, not by variance in work time, but by variance in 
what work is reported as a part of the MMH (e.g., troubleshooting time). The true 
magnitude of an increased workload due to cannibalization can therefore not be measured 
until ways are found to standardize what should and should not be counted as a 
cannibalization MMH.  
3. Cannibalization by Repairable Parts to Consumable Parts Ratio 
All the aircraft parts that were cannibalized fell under either the consumable or 
repairable parts categories. As already described previously, the 817 cannibalization 
reason code is used to document cannibalization of consumable items that are NC or NIS 
at the local supply department. Initial analysis of this malfunction code data suggested 
that only a small fraction of parts cannibalized among the squadrons were consumable 
parts. To be specific, only 22 out of 7,529 MV-22 parts cannibalized were identified as 
consumable parts. Although the vast majority of parts typically cannibalized in the 
community from April 2012 to March 2015 were repairable, this researcher was not 
convinced of the accuracy of this information and took a different approach to determine 
the accuracy of the malfunction code data. 
The 7,529 cannibalization work orders were sorted by malfunction code and again 
revealed only 22 records. Analyzing the data field headers on the work orders, the 
researcher found a Repairable Indicator data field on each work order. Chapter 13.2.11.2 
of the NAMP defines this data field as “Rpr Ind. This is automated based on WUC/UNS 
CM baseline. Y indicates a repairable.” Maintenance work orders are supposed to 
indicate this data field with a “Y” if the part removed is a repairable or an “N” if it is a 
consumable. The historical work orders for all 13 squadrons were sorted by this 
repairable indicator to separate each squadron’s cannibalization work orders into the two 
categories. Table 10 displays the number of repairable parts, consumable parts and the 
consumable part percentage of the total parts cannibalized for each of the 13 squadrons.  
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Table 10.   Number of Cannibalizations by Consumable and Repairable Parts. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
The table revealed the true magnitude of consumable versus repairable parts 
cannibalized in the different squadrons. Among the East Coast squadrons, consumable 
part cannibalizations ranged from 20% to 35% of total cannibalizations in the squadrons. 
Among the seven squadrons, VMMs 266 and 365 stood out as the two squadrons that 
cannibalized more repairable to consumable parts. The consumable to repairable ratio 
column shows the number of repairable parts cannibalized for each every consumable 
part cannibalized in each squadron. In the case of VMM-266, for every 3.8 repairable 
parts cannibalized, one consumable part was cannibalized in the squadron. For VMM-
365, one consumable part was cannibalized for every 3.3 repairable parts cannibalized. 
These ratios were significantly greater than those of VMM-162 and VMMT-204 both of 
which had a 1.8 to one ratio of repairable to consumable parts cannibalized. 
A higher repairable to consumable ratio is better in this category because it 
reveals squadrons that are able to minimize their consumable cannibalizations through in-
house / I-level repair or fabrication of the required consumable part. This is an important 
capability for V-22 squadrons to have because most consumable parts on this new 
platform current do not have an established demand pattern to rate an allocation on 
supply shelves. As a result, consumable items that are NIS or NC can have an excessively 
Repairable Parts Consumable Parts Total  Consumable  as % of total parts Repairable to Consumable Ratio
VMM-162 354 198 552 35.87 1.8
VMM-261 393 162 555 29.19 2.4
VMM-263 440 195 635 30.71 2.3
VMM-264 569 243 812 29.93 2.3
VMM-266 682 178 860 20.70 3.8
VMM-365 464 141 605 23.31 3.3
VMMT-204 718 389 1107 35.14 1.8
VMM-161 467 223 690 47.75 2.1
VMM-163 232 131 363 56.47 1.8
VMM-165 181 118 299 65.19 1.5
VMM-166 335 141 476 42.09 2.4
VMM-268 109 57 166 52.29 1.9
VMM-363 117 66 183 56.41 1.8
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longer NMCS time if it has to be sourced from Bell-Boeing or contracted out as a new 
fabrication requirement to a new supplier.  
The West Coast squadrons comparatively cannibalized more consumables parts 
than their East Coast counterparts. Consumable parts processed ranged from 42% to 65% 
of total cannibalizations. The highest ratio on this Coast was 2.4 repairable parts for every 
one consumable part in the case of VMM-166. One reason for this can be attributed to the 
fact that all six of these squadrons transitioned to the MV-22 aircraft after all the East 
Coast squadrons had transitioned. In effect, they have newer aircraft in their mix of 
aircraft inventory, most of which have upgraded repairable parts compared to those 
aircraft on the East Coast. Another possible explanation for this is that the improvement 
in reliability of some of the MV-22 repairable parts over the past couple of years. This 
has caused the mean time between failure (MTBF) of some of the repairable parts to 
significantly increase, reducing their failure rate. This has therefore caused the gap 
between the number of repairable parts and consumable parts cannibalized to close, 
making it much more evident in the West Coast squadrons.  
4. Cannibalization by Equipment Operational Capability Codes 
EOC codes for the MV-22 are published in the T/M/S MESM, similar to any 
other aircraft platform. These codes relate an aircraft system to a specific aircraft mission 
that the aircraft can safely accomplish. Each aircraft discrepancy work order is assigned 
an EOC to identify to maintainers and aircrew, the degree of degradation to an aircraft’s 
mission caused by the work order, and identifies the aircraft system is responsible for the 
aircrafts’ mission degradation. As directed by COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2B CH-1, 
the MV-22B MESM assigns 11 EOC codes to the MV-22 aircraft systems and 
subsystems. The MV-22 EOC codes taken from the MV-22 MESM and a description of 
the code’s mission degradation to the aircraft are: 
Code C: Assign alpha character (C) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing operations in a combat environment. 
Code D: Assign alpha character (D) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing the Search and Rescue (SAR)/Medical Evacuation 
(MEDEVAC) mission.  
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Code E: Assign alpha character (E) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing the internal cargo transport mission. 
Code F: Assign alpha character (F) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing the external cargo transport mission. 
Code G: Assign alpha character (G) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing the transport of personnel.  
Code H: Assign alpha character (H) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing operation of the aircraft to/from a shipboard environment.  
Code I: Assign alpha character (I) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing operation of the aircraft in environmental extremes. 
Code J: Assign alpha character (J) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing the conduct of the long- range or self-deployment mission.  
Code K: Assign alpha character (K) of the EOC code system(s) are inoperative 
preventing operations in unimproved/rough terrain environments.  
Code L: Assign alpha character (L) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing operations in a day or night Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions (IMC) environment.  
Code Z: Assign alpha character (Z) of the EOC code when system(s) are 
inoperative preventing the aircraft from being safely flown (Department of the 
Navy, 2013, pp. 1-4). 
The vast majority of the cannibalization work orders screened had an assigned 
EOC code identifying under the aircrafts major work unit code (WUC) system, the 
aircraft system that was impaired and the aircrafts’ mission degradation that the 
cannibalization work order was intended to correct. 347 work orders had no identifying 
Received EOC or In Work EOC code documented. Of the 11 MV-22 EOC codes, 10 of 
them were identified with the various cannibalization work orders. There were no work 
orders found with an “E” EOC code. Table 11 displays the cannibalization work orders 




Table 11.   Cannibalizations by Equipment Operational Capability Codes. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
EOC code “Z” (system(s) are inoperative preventing the aircraft from being safely 
flown) appeared across all squadrons as the top mission degrader and the number one 
reason for the majority of MV-22 cannibalizations. This was to no surprise because 
cannibalization actions are often performed to return NMC aircraft to MC making them 
safely flyable. Cannibalization actions performed against the nine remaining EOC codes 
are performed to regain some degree of aircraft mission operational capability, to enable 
the aircraft to perform a specific mission.  
Cannibalizations to correct combat mission degradations, EOC code “C” 
(system(s) are inoperative preventing operations in a combat environment), is the second 
highest in the EOC breakdown. All squadrons with or without previous combat 
deployment history reported this code as their second highest category indicating the 
relative importance of this mission capability in or outside the combat environment. 
However, two squadrons, VMMs 161 and 365 recorded much higher removals under this 
category than the remaining squadrons. Both squadrons historically had completed 
combat deployments but not much more than was completed by the average MV-22 
deployable squadron. Conversely, VMMT-204 is a non-deployable squadron but 
C D F G H I J K L Z
NO 
CODE
VMM-162 16 0 0 0 1 6 0 2 14 443 34
VMM-261 15 0 0 6 0 11 1 0 8 486 27
VMM-263 26 1 1 3 2 19 0 0 15 563 5
VMM-264 35 0 1 1 3 17 1 1 4 703 41
VMM-266 31 1 2 1 2 37 4 5 25 765 17
VMM-365 63 1 1 1 14 18 3 3 14 467 20
VMMT-204 19 0 1 1 4 14 1 2 16 886 52
VMM-161 47 3 1 0 8 23 0 2 12 516 38
VMM-163 18 4 0 0 0 8 0 0 3 300 31
VMM-165 14 2 0 0 0 11 1 0 4 234 29
VMM-166 24 0 0 1 11 11 0 0 7 361 15
VMM-268 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 63 28
VMM-363 6 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 162 10
Equipment Operational Capability Codes
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cannibalized more combat system related components than VMMs 162, 163, 165, and 
261 all of which are deployable squadrons. One possible explanation for this anomaly 
could be the transfer of aircraft and its associated work orders from deployable squadrons 
into VMMT-204’s custody.  
Squadrons on the two Coasts also differed under other EOC categories. For EOC 
“D” (system(s) are inoperative preventing the search and rescue (SAR)/medical 
evacuation (MEDEVAC) mission) the West Coast squadrons exceeded the East in 
cannibalizing to support SAR/MEDEVAC missions. This was a surprising discovery 
considering how much more flying operations and deployments the East Coast conducted 
than the West Coast in that time period. For EOC “J” (system(s) are inoperative 
preventing the conduct of the long- range or self-deployment mission), East Coast 
squadrons, documented more removals in support of long-range and self-deployment 
missions, with VMMs 266 and 365 leading the pack in this category. This was broadly 
due to their history of long range self-deployment operations. Both squadrons again took 
the lead in cannibalizations for correcting unimproved and rough terrain environment 
mission degradation systems under EOC “K” (system(s) are inoperative preventing 
operations in unimproved/rough terrain environments). 
Cannibalization of parts to correct external cargo transport discrepancies, EOC 
“F,” was a rarity among most of the squadron and showed almost no identifiable trend. 
Squadrons on the East Coast recorded more removals under code “G” for troop transport 
missions. However, this could be attributed to the fact that the East Coast squadrons 
collectively have executed more deployments over the period than the West Coast 
squadrons and as a result have had a requirement to execute more troop transport 
missions than their West Coast counterparts. 
VMMs 166 and 365 stood out for recording 11 and 14 cannibalizations 
respectively under EOC “H.” These cannibalizations were performed for correcting 
discrepancies that prevented their assigned aircraft from operating in a shipboard 
environment. The researcher expected to have found a direct relationship between 
cannibalizations in this category and the type of historical deployments executed by the 
squadrons. However, this was not the case across the squadrons. VMM-365 recorded the 
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highest removals in this category; however, historical AMSRR data and training exercise 
employment plan (TEEP) revealed that this squadron over the five year period did not 
execute a shipboard or Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployment. VMM-166 
conversely showed a history of one shipboard MEU deployment and was appropriate to 
have cannibalizations in this category. VMM-161 was the third highest squadron with 
eight shipboard related system components, but again had no history of MEU 
deployments. This squadron recorded more removals under this category than VMMs 
261,263 and 266, all of which are ship-board MEUs with multiple historical MEU 
deployments on file. 
Cannibalizations under code “I” (system(s) are inoperative preventing operation 
of the aircraft in environmental extremes) and “L” (system(s) are inoperative preventing 
operations in a day or night instrument meteorological conditions) had several removals 
in those categories but did not reveal any significant trends among the squadrons. As 
expected, the East Coast squadrons collectively documented more removals in this 
category than the West Coast, commensurate with their higher total number of 
cannibalizations. One reason for the higher removals in these categories is the fact that 
these two codes are the next most significant mission degraders next to the “Z” 
(system(s) are inoperative preventing the aircraft from being safely flown) and “C” codes 
(system(s) are inoperative preventing operations in a combat environment). The two 
system degrader codes are also not specific to a type of aircraft mission, but are mostly 
required for the day to day normal operations in other than normal weather conditions.  
5. Cannibalizations per 100 Flight Hours 
The researcher analyzed the squadrons to see how cannibalizations varied in the 
community by individual cannibalization rates. Cannibalization rate as previously 
described is a common measure used throughout naval aviation to report up-line how 
individual squadrons perform on cannibalizations within their squadrons. The formula 
used for this calculation was the DON’s COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2B CH-1 
approved formula referenced in Chapter III. This ratio gave each squadron’s number of 
cannibalizations performed for every 100 flight hours flown for that reporting period. 
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Using this formula, each squadron’s rate was calculated for the five year period. Table 12 
and Figure 4 depict the calculated rates for the 13 squadrons. 
Table 12.   Squadron Cannibalization Rates, 2010 to 2015. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Figure 4.  Squadron Cannibalization Rates, 2010 to 2015. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Total Number of Cannibalizations Total Flight Hours Cannibalizations per 100 flthrs
VMM-162 552 11,107 5.0
VMM-261 555 9,816 5.7
VMM-263 635 11,202 5.7
VMM-264 812 12,755 6.4
VMM-266 860 11,841 7.3
VMM-365 605 12,570 4.8
VMMT-204 1107 18,341 6.0
VMM-161 690 12,056 5.7
VMM-163 363 6,562 5.5
VMM-165 299 7,498 4.0
VMM-166 476 10,034 4.7
VMM-268 166 1,271 13.1
VMM-363 183 3,515 5.2
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Descriptive statistics performed on the cannibalization rates in Table 12 revealed 
a range of 3.98 to 13.06 cannibalizations per 100 flight hour across the 13 squadrons. The 
mean rate was 6.07 with a standard deviation of 2.25 cannibalizations per 100 flight hour. 
Individual mean rates for the two separate Coasts were 5.8 and 6.4 for the East and West 
Coasts respectively. Between the two Coasts, the West Coast squadrons comparatively 
performed better than the East Coast squadrons in cannibalization rates over the period.  
Among the East Coast squadrons, VMM-365 outperformed the other six 
squadrons with a rate of 4.8 cannibalizations for every 100 flight hours flown in the five 
year period, while VMM-266 measured at a 7.3 per 100 flight hour. These two squadrons 
differed by 2.5 cannibalizations per 100 flight hour between the best and worst 
performing squadron on the East Coast. Four out of the seven squadrons performed better 
in this view, operating below the mean rate of 5.8 while VMMs 264,266 and VMMT-204 
were seen to be above the mean rate on the East Coast.  
Looking at the West Coast squadrons, VMM-165 performed better than the five 
other squadrons with a rate of 4.0 cannibalizations per 100 flight hour. This rate was the 
best across all 13 squadrons and 0.8 cannibalizations per 100 flight hour lower than the 
4.8 recorded by VMM-365, the best performing East Coast squadron. Comparatively, the 
West Coast had a much higher mean rate due to VMM-268’s high rate. This squadron 
performed much worst across all 13 squadrons with a difference of 9.1 cannibalizations 
per 100 flight hour between that squadron and VMM-165, the best performing squadron. 
The researcher queried all 166 historical cannibalization work orders for VMM-
268 to investigate if he could uncover any significant explanations why this squadron had 
such a high cannibalization rate. However, every work order proved to be an actual 
cannibalization action taken to remove and replace a documented part number indicated 
on the work order. Every entry block on the work order was appropriately filled out with 
the work orders documented across a range of different aircraft. None of the corrective 
actions investigated indicated any of the work orders was initiated as an administrative 
action taken to correct aircraft logs and records documentation. The researcher concluded 
that the high cannibalization rate calculated was a true indication of the squadrons’ 
performance and not an outlier that should be disregarded from the analysis. 
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The Navy’s measure of cannibalization, based on the 100 flight hour formula, 
suggests that an aircraft squadron’s cannibalization performance could be indicative of 
how much flying the squadron accomplishes in that period. As reveled in Table 12, some 
squadrons fly a lot more but cannibalize fewer parts while others that cannibalize more 
recorded lower flight hours. The researcher decided to investigate if there was a statistical 
significant correlation between a squadron’s total number of cannibalizations and its total 
flight hours.  
Using the same flight hours and number of cannibalizations data in Table 12, a 
correlation was run against the two data fields. Results of the correlation test revealed a 
Correlation Coefficient of +0.94 between the variables. A positive correlation coefficient 
indicates a linear uphill relationship between two variables, with coefficients of 0.7 and 
higher indicating a strong relationship. The calculated correlation coefficient of +0.94 
revealed that there is a very strong positive linear relationship between total number of 
cannibalizations and total flight hours. Conceptually, this meant that the squadrons with 
higher flight hours should have recorded higher cannibalizations than those with lower 
flight hours, and those with lower flight hours should have recorded lower 
cannibalizations. This principle however did not hold true across all the squadrons as 
revealed by the data in Table 12. Figure 5 is a scatter plot of the total flight hours against 










Figure 5.  Total Flight Hours versus Total Cannibalizations Plot. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
The scatter plot in Figure 5 displays each squadron and where they fall above or 
below the calculated trendline. The equation of the line revealed a calculated R-squared 
of 0.8891 for the model. An R-square, also known as the coefficient of determination, is a 
statistical measure of the percentage of the response variable variation that is measured 
by the model. In the case of this model, it explains how much variation in our number of 
cannibalizations response variable, is explained by the model. The calculated R-squared 
of 0.8891 revealed that, 88.9% of the variations in total squadron cannibalizations can be 
explained by the total number of flight hours accomplished by the squadron during the 
given time frame. The remaining variation not explained by this model may be attributed 
to individual squadron maintenance practices that set some squadrons apart as better 
performers at cannibalizing components (or it may be to chance alone). 
From the model in Figure 5, squadrons that generally performed better at 
cannibalization during this period were VMMs 162, 165, 166, and 365. These squadrons 
might also be said to have had better internal maintenance practices that enable them to 
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better manage component cannibalizations than the other squadrons. VMMs 161, 163, 
261, 263, and VMMT-204 were the squadrons that were performing cannibalizations at 
the calculated model average, while VMMs 264,266, 268, and 363 might be considered 
as below average squadrons in the performance of cannibalization when considered on 
the per 100 flight hour basis. These squadrons may have had poor or inefficient 
maintenance practices that caused them to inefficiently manage their aircraft 
cannibalizations. As noted in Chapter III, the scope of this thesis is limited to a 
descriptive analysis of the historical data—the inferential tests needed to compare the 
performance of these squadrons has not been performed, so we cannot claim that the 
difference between VMM-162 and VMM-264, for example, was due to anything more 
than chance. However, the data clearly show that in this historical period, VMM-162 did 
perform better than VMM-264 in terms of cannibalizations per 100 flight hour. 
6. Cannibalizations on Deployment and by Deployment Type 
Deployed squadrons encounter a surge in flight operations due to increased 
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) when deployed away from their home base. Traditional 
MV-22 squadron deployments over the past five years have consisted of two main types: 
Shipboard deployments in support of a MEU and land-based deployments to Afghanistan 
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The researcher attempted to uncover 
how squadron cannibalizations varied against squadrons on the same type of deployments 
and how it varied between the two types of deployments. Squadrons analyzed were six 
East Coast squadrons and one West Coast squadron that deployed between 2010 and 
2012 in support of the two deployments. This selection was done to allow for deployment 
theatre operational consistency and squadron mission proficiency during the period. One 
squadron, VMM-162 completed both types of deployment in the same period and was 
included to see how their practice of cannibalization as a squadron was affected by the 
type of deployment executed. 
The land-based OEF squadrons selected were VMMs 161, 162, 264, and 365. All 
squadrons deployed to the same location with 12 aircraft and conducted flying operations 
over a six month deployment period. Shipboard MEU based squadrons selected were 
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VMMs 162, 261,263, and 266 all of which deployed to the same area of operation (AO) 
with 12 aircraft. Of the four squadrons, 162 and 261 deployed for eight months, and 
VMMs 263 and 266 deployed for 10 and nine months respectively. Each MEU squadron 
deployed aboard a different ship but operated on the same aviation consolidated 
allowance list (AVCAL) of supply stock posture. Table 13 shows the cannibalization data 
for the seven squadrons over the two types of deployment. 
Table 13.   MV-22 Deployment Cannibalization Data. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Analyzing the land-based deployment squadrons, the average monthly number of 
cannibalizations for these squadrons was 21 while deployed. Referring back to Figure 5, 
the average monthly number of cannibalizations for VMM-162 when the squadron was 
operating at home base was 8.7. This increase in monthly average number of 
cannibalizations while deployed confirmed that higher OPTEMPO increase the need to 
cannibalize components. 
VMM-161 proved itself as a better squadron at cannibalization than both 365 and 
162 who previously had shown to perform better. The data showed that their total 
cannibalization for the same deployment length was more than 40% lower than that of 




VMM-264 20 158 0.11 167 10 0.06 178 2,345 7.6
VMM-162 10 112 0.08 113 9 0.07 122 2,888 4.2
VMM-365 21 120 0.15 103 38 0.27 141 2,977 4.7
VMM-161 11 68 0.14 75 4 0.05 79 2,114 3.7




VMM-162 15 107 0.12 73 49 0.40 122 1,682 7.3
VMM-261 11 126 0.08 78 48 0.35 137 1,546 8.9
VMM-263 23 133 0.15 103 53 0.34 156 1,929 8.1
VMM-266 83 289 0.22 239 133 0.36 372 2,236 16.6
MV-22 Land Based Deployment Cannibalization Data
MV-22 MEU Shipboard Deployment Cannibalization Data
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VMM-365. VMM 162 also performed slightly better than VMM-365 on the OEF 
deployment, contrary to what previous data analysis that indicated VMM-365 performed 
better historically, overall.  
Consistent with previous analysis, VMM-264 performed the worse with a 7.6 
cannibalization rate. All four squadrons on a broader scope, each recorded lower 
cannibalization rates on deployment than when operating at their home base. 
The land-based squadrons when analyzed on a consumable to repairable basis, 
showed consistency between three of the four squadrons. Percentage of consumable 
cannibalizations to total cannibalizations for VMMs 161, 162 and 264 ranged between 
5% to 7% while VMM-365 broke out at 27%. This was more than triple the number of 
consumable cannibalizations recorded by VMM-264. 
The land-based squadrons were analyzed to see how cannibalizations were used 
to correct PMC and NMC maintenance discrepancies. Percentage of total 
cannibalizations that were used to correct PMC discrepancies between the four squadrons 
ranged from 8% to 15% with VMM-365 recording the highest at 15%. Squadrons that 
typically display a higher PMC cannibalization rate do so to strive to maintain a good 
portion of their aircraft in FMC status. This allows them the flexibility of easily assigning 
an FMC aircraft to the flight schedule rather than systematically juggle PMC aircrafts on 
a daily basis to find aircraft that will satisfy specific flight schedule mission requirements. 
The researcher attempted to find out reasons why VMMs 161 and 162 both 
seemed to have performed better at cannibalization than VMM-365 in a deployment 
environment. A maintenance work order history and historical AMSRR reports inquiry 
was conducted which revealed two explanations for this: VMM-161 initially arrived in 
the deployment AO in July 2012 operating 12 MV-22s. As part of the OEF equipment 
drawdown process, the squadron effectively reduced their aircraft inventory to 10 MV-
22s in August 2012, returning two aircraft to CONUS. This caused them to operate with 
10 aircraft for the remainder of the deployment, contributing to their reduced total 
number of cannibalizations. VMM-365s’ inquiry revealed that one of their aircraft, 
number 166738 suffered a mishap during the deployment, causing the aircraft to become 
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NMC for an extended period of time. The squadrons’ desire to expedite the aircrafts’ 
return to MC status required cannibalizing several unique parts that were not stocked in 
the local supply system from a Phase Maintenance inducted aircraft, consequently 
causing their cannibalization rate to increase. 
An analysis of the shipboard MEU squadrons revealed that MEU squadrons also 
increased in monthly average number of cannibalizations when deployed. Their 
calculated average number of monthly cannibalizations was 29 per month. Analyzing 
their rates, these MEU squadrons generally performed worse at cannibalizations than 
their land-based counterparts. On an individual squadron basis, VMM-162’s 
cannibalization performance was the best between the four squadrons which was 
consistent with previous findings that this squadron performed better. VMMs 261 and 
263 previously had been found to be on the same level of performance with a 5.7 
cannibalizations per 100 flight hour for each squadron. However, when the two 
squadrons were put on the same type of deployment, VMM-263 was revealed to have 
slightly better performance. Their cannibalization rate was 8.1 compared to VMM-261’s 
rate of 8.9. The researcher attributed this 0.9 rate differential to the two month differential 
in deployment lengths of the two squadrons which resulted in VMM-263’s higher flight 
hours. 
Consistent with previous findings, on these historical data, VMM-266 comparably 
was the worst at cannibalization between the four MEU squadrons with a 16.6 
cannibalizations per 100 flight hour rate. Although this squadron was deployed a month 
less than VMM-263, they had a rate differential of 8.5 higher than that of VMM-263. 
Even though they logged 307 more flight hours in a lesser deployment timeframe than 
VMM-263, their total number of cannibalizations was 138% higher than that of VMM-
263. 
The researcher compared the two deployment types against each other and 
uncovered the following finding: The MEU cannibalization rates comparatively were 
much higher than those of the land-based deployed OEF squadrons. This suggested that 
MEU deployed squadrons generally perform worse at cannibalization than the land-based 
deployed squadrons. This finding was supported when VMM-162’s MEU and OEF 
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deployment performances were compared against each other. Their MEU cannibalization 
rate of 7.3 reduced to 4.2 cannibalizations per 100 flight hours when they switched to a 
land-based OEF deployment. 
The two deployment groups were compared to see how they varied in overall 
percentages of consumable items cannibalized. Percentages for the MEU squadrons 
ranged from 34% to 40%, while the land-based squadrons ranged from 5% to 27%. This 
MEU range on average was more than three times higher than that of the land-based OEF 
deployed squadrons. This finding suggested that on a given deployment, a MEU 
deployed squadron will generally cannibalize more consumable parts than a land-based 
deployed squadron. This finding was again supported by VMM-162’s MEU and OEF 
data. Their MEU consumable percentage reduced from 40% to 7% when the squadron 
switched from the MEU to a land-based deployment. 
The researcher concluded that there exists a variation in cannibalization between 
MV-22 squadrons when they deploy away from their home base, and that this variation is 
also affected even more based on the type of deployment. 
B. ANALYZING COMPONENTS THAT DRIVE CANNIBALIZATION, AND 
HOW THOSE COMPONENTS CHANGE OVER TIME 
The parts and components cannibalized in the MV-22 community vary across a 
wide range of part numbers and national item identification numbers (NIIN). Each 
component part number or NIIN is assigned a nomenclature from the component 
manufacturer as a quick reference for identifying the type of part and the functionality 
provided by this component.  Components cannibalized in naval aviation squadrons are 
tracked through the naval aviation logistics command maintenance information system 
(NALCOMIS). Each component cannibalized is documented on a maintenance action 
work order in the NALCOMIS to be later retrieved by system analysts and T/M/S 
Baseline Managers for identifying culprit components with reliability concerns 
. The researcher utilized the five year cannibalized component data to identify 
specific components that drove cannibalizations in the community. This component data 
was sorted yearly and into a top ten frequently cannibalized list for each year. The yearly 
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lists were then analyzed over time to see how the relative priority of each component 
changed from year to year and as more MV-22 squadrons were added to the community. 
1. Top 10 Cannibalization Drivers, 2010 
The 2010 MV-22 community consisted of nine operational squadrons and two 
flight test squadrons. Community-wide cannibalizations totaled 1,242 components across 
85 In Reporting (IR) MV-22 aircraft, with the test squadrons only contributing to a 
fraction of the overall cannibalization. The top three cannibalizing squadrons for that 
period, VMMs 266, 365 and VMMT-204 accounted for 50.5% of the total 
cannibalizations. The 1,242 total items processed consisted of 190 individual component 
nomenclatures. Figure 6 is a frequency distribution of the top ten frequently cannibalized 
components for 2010. 
Figure 6.  Top 10 Cannibalized Components, 2010. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
The top 10 frequently cannibalized components totaled 338 parts, accounting for 


















actuators and VFGs were the top three drivers of cannibalization in the community. 
Seven of the top 10 components were avionics related components with the remaining 
three related to the aircraft rotor system, flight control system and the airframe structural 
system. Some components in the list were identified to have more than one unit per 
assembly (UPA) of that component on an aircraft. Of these, blade assembly was the 
component with the highest UPA of six blades per aircraft and ranked 7th, while FCCs 
were the next highest UPA with three per aircraft and ranked 9th. 
2. Top 10 Cannibalization Drivers, 2011 
The aircraft community increased in size with the addition of two operational 
squadrons in 2011. The number of operational squadrons increased from nine to 11, 
resulting in 13 total squadrons by the end of 2011. Total number of cannibalized 
components increased from 1,242 in 2010 to 1,265 components across 105 average 
aircraft IR status. Figure 7 is the 2011 top 10 chart of cannibalized components. 
Figure 7.  Top 10 Cannibalized Components, 2011. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
















The 1,265 cannibalized components consisted of components across 203 
nomenclatures, which was an increase of 13 line items from the 2010. These top 10 
components totaled 335, accounting for 26% of the overall cannibalizations. VMM-264 
moved up in ranking to join VMM-266 and VMMT-204 as the top three cannibalizing 
squadrons in the community, collectively accounting for 40.5% of the total community 
cannibalizations. This was a decrease of 10% in cannibalizations from what the top three 
cannibalizing squadrons recorded in 2010. 
Relative component ranking on the top 10 list changed slightly from 2010 to 
2011. Aircraft power supplies and electro-mechanical actuators still remained the top two 
cannibalized components in the community; however, actual quantities of these 
components decreased from that recorded in 2010. Fifty seven power supplies and 38 
electro-mechanical actuators were cannibalized in 2011, compared to 58 and 47 
respectively in 2010. VFG cannibalizations decreased from 43 to 28 (65%), moving it 
from 3rd to 7th position. Meanwhile, a new requirement for engine nacelle blowers made 
it to the 3rd place. Additional fleet cannibalization requirements for electronic 
components, bleed turbine valves, and nacelle interface units (NIU) also increased, 
pushing them up the list of drivers into the top 10 category. 
All 2010 top 10 components that remained on the 2011 list decreased in quantities 
between the two years even with the addition of two new squadrons and the 
corresponding increase in average number of IR aircraft. None of the 2010 top 10 
components moved up in relative position on the 2011 list. Four components, Central 
Deice Distributer (CDD), signal data converter (SDC), grip control assemblies and FCCs 
made it off the 2010 top 10 list due to reduced cannibalization requirements. 
3. Top 10 Cannibalization Drivers, 2012 
Two squadrons joined the community in 2012 increasing the size of the 
community to 15 MV-22 squadrons. This caused the average IR inventory of aircraft to 
increase from 105 to 136 MV-22 aircraft, a 29.5% increase. The total count of 
cannibalized components increased by 5% from 1,265 in 2011 to 1,337 cannibalized 
components in 2012 with the increases in aircraft inventory. The number of 
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nomenclatures cannibalized decreased from 201 to 190, with VMMs 164, 266 and 161 as 
the top three cannibalizing squadrons. These squadrons now accounted for 38% of total 
community cannibalizations, a decrease of 2% from 2011. VMM-161 moved into the top 
three cannibalizing squadron category bumping VMMT-204 out of that category for the 
first time. Figure 8 is the 2012 top 10 cannibalized component chart. 
Figure 8.  Top 10 Cannibalized Components, 2012. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
The 2012 list of top 10 drivers comparatively showed more significant variations 
than the prior year, and accounted for 28% of total cannibalizations in the community. 
Aircraft power supply moved from the 1st to the 5th position as cannibalization 
requirements from the previous year decreased from 57 to 39. Simultaneously, electronic 
component requirements increased moving it in place as the year’s top cannibalization 
driver. Electro-mechanical actuators held the 2nd position in 2011; however, decreasing 
requirements in 2012 moved it off the top 10 list to the 28th position in the hierarchy. 
Engine nacelle blowers also moved up the hierarchy to the 2nd place, while Engine Air 
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Particulate System (EAPS) blowers reclined down to 35th position as a result of 21 fewer 
requisitions.  
Aircraft blades and VFGs continued to remain high cannibalization drivers over 
the three year period. From 26 blades cannibalized in 2010, the quantity decreased to 24 
in 2011 and spiked to 53 in 2012 moving it in place as the third highest driver. This was 
an increase of 75% in cannibalization activity for this component over the one year 
period. VFGs also showed cyclic activities from 43 in 2010 to 28 in 2011 and increased 
again to 33 in 2012. 
Two components, aircraft side panels and turbine bleed valves, showed fairly 
consistent activity from 2011 and continued to remain on the top 10 list for 2012, while 
multi-function display (MFD) unit also made its way from 22nd to 9th place in hierarchy.  
4. Top 10 Cannibalization Drivers, 2013 
Three additional squadrons joined the MV-22 community in 2013, increasing the 
size from 15 to 18 squadrons. With this increase, the average number of IR MV-22 
aircraft increased by 30% from 143 in 2012 to 174 by the end of 2013. This marginal 
higher increase in size compared to the previous years. However, it did not reflect a 
significant spike in cannibalization activity, as the squadrons added included one non-
operational squadron, HMX-1. Total community-wide cannibalization activity increased 
to 1,394, a 4% increase with VMMs 163, 165, and VMMT-204 as the top three 
cannibalizing squadrons. With VMMT-204 moving back into the top three squadrons, the 
three squadrons now accounted for 26% of the total cannibalization activity. Figure 9 is 
the 2013 top 10 cannibalized component chart. 
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Figure 9.  MV-22 Top 10 Cannibalized Components, 2013. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
The 2013 top 10 components compared to the previous years, showed a much 
higher marginal increase in total quantity and overall percentage of total cannibalizations. 
The total count of activity making this list was 463 cannibalizations across 204 
nomenclatures, and accounted for 33% of the overall cannibalization activity. This 
percentage comparably was the highest calculated among the top 10 category from 2010 
to 2013. 
Six of the 10 components on were repeats from the 2012 list. Of these, VFGs 
jumped from 8th position in 2011 to the 1st position in 2012, making it the top 
cannibalization driver. This significant rise in hierarchy was as a result of a 136% 
increase in cannibalizations from 33 in 2011 to 78 VFGs cannibalized in 2012. This 
marginal increase in activity was the highest seen among any of the historical top 10 
components from one year to the next. 
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Activity for aircraft blade assemblies continued to increase in this period, again 
moving it up from 3rd place in 2012 to 2nd place in 2013. From 46 requirements in 2012, 
community-wide cannibalization activities resulted in 66 additional requirements in 
2013; a marginal increase of 57% from the previous year. In a conservative assumption 
that all 66 cannibalized blades were consolidated against few aircraft, this component 
alone would have accounted for 11 aircraft that were held in NMC status for that period.  
Aircraft power supply and hydraulic drive units both made their way higher up to 
the 3rd and 4th positions respectively. From 39 requirements the previous year to 60 
requirements in 2013, the operational need to cannibalize power supplies spiked by 56% 
in the community, while the hydraulic drive units increased by 34%, due to a marginal 
increase in 14 components. 
Direct current generators, also known as constant frequency generators (CFG), 
appeared on the top 10 list in 2013 for the first time in the four year period. The 
operational need to cannibalize this component cycled from 10 CFGs cannibalized in 
2010 to five in 2011, but then increased to 17 requirements in 2012. This increase in 
demand continued through into 2013, spiking up to 47 generators, an increase of 176% 
from the 2012 quantity. 
Two components, FCCs and electro-mechanical actuators made their way back 
into the top 10 hierarchy after both being off the list for a few years. The last appearances 
on the list for these components were 2010 for FCCs and 2011 for the actuators 
respectively. Both 2013 requirement numbers for these components were however lower 
than were recorded at their last appearance in the top 10 list. 
Aircraft wire harnesses also made its first appearance on the list in the four year 
period as a result of a fleet requirement to cannibalize 24 harnesses. Similar to most 
components on the list, fleet requirements to cannibalize these harnesses creeped from 8 
in 2010 to 11 and 13 in 2011 and 2012 respectively leading to its first appearance in 
2013. 
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5. Top 10 Cannibalization Drivers, 2014 
The 2014 community increased with the addition of one operational squadron, 
increasing the size of the community to 19 squadrons. Average IR aircraft increased from 
174 in 2013 to 198. This was an increase of 14% and a comparatively smaller increase 
than was seen in 2013. This smaller marginal increase resulted in a much higher increase 
in cannibalization activity in the community. Community-wide cannibalizations for the 
year totaled 1,528, a 10% increase from 2013. This was the highest increase in 
cannibalization activity recorded over the five year period. Figure 10 is the Top 10 list for 
2014. 
Figure 10.  MV-22 Top 10 Cannibalized Components, 2014. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
The drivers for 2014 accounted for 395 of the year’s cannibalization activity and 
25% of the total community cannibalization requirements. Six components on the list 
were repeats from 2013, three of which had been carried through from 2010 to 2014. Of 
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these six components, three of them showed increases in activity while the other three 
showed decreases in activity, causing them to relatively move down in hierarchy. 
The two types of aircraft generators, VFGs and CFGs coincidentally became the 
two top drivers of cannibalization in the community. CFGs pushed up from 5th position 
in 2013 to become the year’s top cannibalization driver. This position among the top 
three drivers was the first for the CFG over the five year period. From 47 in 2013 to 59 in 
2014, a fleet cannibalization requirement for CFGs increased by 26%. Conversely, VFG 
cannibalization requirements decreased by 36% from 78 in 2013 to 50 in 2014 moving it 
down from 1st to 2nd position. 
Aircraft blade assemblies although moving down from 2nd to 3rd place, 
continued to be a major driver in the community over the five year period. For the first 
time during the observed period, blade cannibalization activity decreased by 26%, which 
was the most significant decrease in this components history, considering the yearly 
marginal increases in additional squadrons and IR aircraft. 
Aircraft panel assemblies continued to remain in the top drivers in 2014 with a 
small decrease of nine removals from 2013. This component consistently through the five 
year timeframe, cycled in the number of panels cannibalized, and did not reveal a steady 
increase proportional to the increase in community size and IR aircraft over the period. 
Two components, aircraft Coanda Tube assemblies and CDUs made their way 
into the top 10 category for the first time with significant increases from recorded 
historical quantities. From three Coanda Tubes removed in both 2012 and 2013, the 
community’s requirement to cannibalize this component increased to 36 in 2014. This 
was an increase of 12 times the normal cannibalized quantity, and the biggest spike 
observed among any of the top 10 components across the years. CDU cannibalization 
requirements increased by 176% as 2013 quantities increased from 13 to 36 in 2014. 
Unlike the Coanda Tubes, this component had consistently showed yearly 
cannibalizations ranging from nine to 16 since 2010, but spiked to 36 in 2014. 
Activity for FCC continued to increase between the two years, causing a marginal 
increase of 10 FCCs in 2014, moving it up in hierarchy from 10th to 7th position. A 
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forward look into 2015 recorded cannibalizations showed 14 FCCs cannibalized as of 30 
June 2015, and will most likely remain as a top driver in 2015 if this 2015 historical 
pattern continues throughout the year. 
MFDs reappeared as a top 10 driver for the second time in the five year period. 
The last appearance for this component was 2012, ranking 9th that year with a quantity of 
25. Although this quantity increased to 26 in 2013, other more significant components 
pushed it down in ranking to 18th position in 2013 until a larger marginal increase of 10 
additional squadrons caused it to become a major driver again. 
Aircraft power supplies for the first time over the five year period, showed its 
most significant decrease in fleet cannibalization requirements. From its highest ever 
recorded quantity of 60 in 2013, the 2014 data revealed a reduction of 48% with only 31 
components cannibalized for that year. Its 2014 position in 9th place among the top 10 
was the lowest this component had ever reclined over the five year observed period. 
Wiring harness continued to remain a top driver after its first appearance on the 
2013 top 10 list. Fleet activity for this component however increased from 24 to 30 over 
the one year period but moved down in hierarchy to the 10th position. However, this 
component might not remain a top cannibalization driver in 2015 since a forward look 
into 2015 cannibalization data showed a quantity of only six harnesses cannibalized as of 
30 June 2015. 
6. Top Five Readiness Degrader Components, 2010 to 2014 
Across the five year observed period the community’s top five components in 
terms of average number of components cannibalized per year were Power Supplies, 
VFGs, blade assemblies, panel assemblies and electronic components. The yearly and 





Table 14.   Top Five Degrader Component Cannibalizations, 2010 to 2014. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Power supplies ranked first among all MV-22 cannibalized components with the 
highest average number of cannibalizations. Subsequent ranking for the remaining four 
components are displayed in Table 14. The first four ranking components appeared each 
year as top 10 drivers, while Electronic components only appeared in three of the five 
years. Although it did not appear yearly as a top 10 driver, its overall cumulative average 
among the other components cannibalized in the community was high enough to move it 
into 5th place. Figure 11 is a scatter plot of the cumulative yearly cannibalizations with 











Nomenclature 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average Ranking
POWER SUPPLY 58 57 39 60 31 49 1st
GENERATOR,VARIABLE, 43 28 33 78 50 46 2nd
BLADE ASSEMBLY,AIRC 26 24 42 66 49 41 3rd
PANEL ASSY,SIDE,AIR 37 26 33 43 38 35 4th
ELECTRONIC COMPONENT 14 35 56 38 13 31 5th
2010 to 2014 Top Five Readiness Degrader Components
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Figure 11.  Top Five Readiness Degrader Trends, 2010 to 2014. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Figure 11 graphically depicts how the top five degraders have trended over the 
last five year period, giving an indication of which direction they might be expected to 
head in the follow-on years.  
Power supplies, although the top degrader of the period, showed the most 
significant improvement and was the only downward trending among the five 
components. Even though there appeared to be a significant spike in 2013, the 2014 
figure showed a significant reduction allowing for its continued downward trend. A 
forward look into 2015 cannibalization data revealed a quantity of one power supply 
cannibalized as of 30 June 2015. If this trend is maintained throughout the year, this 
component for the first time will not appear among the major cannibalization driver 
category in 2015. 
 65
Aircraft blade assemblies had the most upward trend among the five components 
with an R-Squared value of 0.64 for the trendline. This R-squared was the strongest 
among all five components indicating a strong goodness of fit of the trendline. The 
upward trend indicates that this component’s cannibalization problem is getting worse as 
the community and number of flying activities continues to increase. A forward look into 
2015 cannibalization data revealed that 25 blades had been cannibalized as of 30 June 
2015, confirming a high chance that this component will continue to remain a top 
degrader for 2015 if the trend continues.  
VFGs looked to also have an upward trend but with a much lower R-Squared. 
This component had a cyclic trend from the raw data and did not show much of a 
progress in terms of how good or bad the components’ cannibalization problem was 
getting. Based on the 2015 data, recorded number of VFG cannibalizations as of 30 June 
2015 was 23. This component can be anticipated to have roughly about the same number 
of cannibalizations at the end of 2015 as it did in 2014 and will remain a top degrader.  
Panel assemblies showed a slight upward trend with a low R-Squared value of 
0.22. The slight upward trend indicates this component continued to be a problem and 
showed no improvements in cannibalization activity over the period. This component 
also is likely to maintain its trend and continue to be a top degrader in 2015 since 17 
panel assemblies had been cannibalized as of 30 June 2015.  
Electronic components showed no directional trend over the five year period. The 
significant problem causing the spike in 2012 cannibalization activity seemed to have 
been resolved and is anticipated to continue with its directionless trend over the next 
year. Eight panel assemblies were shown to have been cannibalized as of 30 June 2015, 
indicating an anticipated number of less than 20 cannibalizations by end of 2015 if the 
2015 trend continues. It is unclear if this component will remain a top degrader in 2015 
and should be monitored for any significant spikes in activity.  
7. Worst Trending Components, 2010 to 2014 
Among the 21 components that appeared across all yearly top 10 lists, five 
components showed to be the worst trending components in terms of the slopes of their 
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individual trendlines. These components need the most scrutiny between the other drivers 
since all showed significant spikes in recent cannibalization activity. Table 15 is the 
yearly cannibalizations and calculated slopes of these five components:  
Table 15.   Five Worst Trending Components, 2010 to 2014. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Of these components, blade assembly was the only component to have 
consistently appeared every year as a top readiness degrader as previously identified. 
direct current generator, hydraulic drive unit and wiring harnesses all had appeared in two 
of the five top 10 degrader lists, while Coanda Tube assemblies only appeared once 
recently in 2014. 
These components statistically evolved as the worst trending due to significant 
spikes in recent cannibalization activities, causing their trendlines to be much steeper 
relative to the other 16 components. These components should be giving the most 
scrutiny and monitored since all of these significant spikes happened between 2013 and 
2014 giving these components the potential to become major fleet degraders if not 





Nomenclature 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Slope Rank
GENERATOR,DIRECT CU 10 5 17 47 59 14 1st
DRIVE UNIT,HYDRAULI 6 7 41 55 28 9.2 2nd
BLADE ASSEMBLY,AIRC 26 24 42 66 49 8.8 3rd
WIRING HARNESS 8 11 13 25 35 6.8 4th
TUBE ASSY,COANDA,AI 0 7 3 3 36 6.8 5th
  2010 to 2014 Five Worst Trending Components
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Figure 12.  Five Worst Trending Components Plot. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
Direct current generators had the worst slope of the five components and should 
warrant the immediate attention of the supply system working group (SSWG) and the 
component’s item manger (IM). The associated trendline displays the steepness of this 
line in comparison to the other components, and the displayed R-Squared of 0.854 
indicates a strong fit of this line to the plotted data points. This component’s recent spike 
in activity was quite alarming and was one of the worst spikes seen among all the driver 
components. This component will most likely continue to be a top degrader since the 
2015 data showed 23 generators cannibalized as of 30 June 2015. 
 Hydraulic drive unit was the second-to-worst trending component again due to 
recently increased cannibalization activity in the past few years. Even though the R-
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squared value of 0.4647 for the trendline is not as strong as the other four components, 
the calculated slope of 9.2 makes this trend very significant to also warrant immediate 
attention by the SSWG and the IM to address any reliability issues or supply constraints 
that might exist.  
Aircraft blade assembly as depicted in Figure 12 was the third worst trending 
component. This component as already discussed previously, warrants immediate 
attention since the problem looks to be getting worse based on the average number of 
cannibalizations per year. As already addressed, each MV-22 has six aircraft blades 
installed all of which spin and mostly wear at the same rate. This raises the potential of 
wearing out all six blades concurrently and can significantly cause more sporadic spikes 
in component demand and cannibalization activity if the blades for a specific lot of 
aircraft all start becoming worn out concurrently.  
The trendline for wiring harness had the highest R-squared value of 0.9045 
indicating a very good fit of the line around the plots. With a trend of 6.8 and the 
component’s consistent recent increases in activity, this trend is bad and needs to be 
monitored to avoid a surprise spike in demand and uncontrollable increase in 
cannibalization activity. A sample of discrepancy maintenance work orders cross-
referenced with their associated cannibalization work orders revealed that most of the 
harnesses were cannibalized to replace excessively worn out harnesses that were beyond 
repair capability. This can quickly become a huge fleet degrader as aircraft continue to 
accumulate more flight hours. A look at the 2015 cannibalization data showed 21 
harnesses cannibalized as of 30 June 2015, potentially still remaining a top degrader.  
Coanda Tube assemblies also had a bad upward trend with a slope of 6.8. Even 
though the R-squared of 0.5238 is not as high as some of the other components, the 
significant spike from three cannibalizations to 36 in 2014 raises an alarm for potential 
continued spikes ahead. As of 30 June 2015, 15 Coanda Tubes had been reported as 
cannibalized. If this 2015 trend continues to the end of the year, this component will once 
again likely become a major degrader for 2015. 
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8. Top 10 Driver Comparisons between Two Squadrons 
The data for two squadrons, VMM-161 and VMM-268 were compared to see how 
much their individual cannibalization drivers as separate squadrons, varied from each 
other. Both squadrons assessed were selected from the West Coast and compared during 
their first year as transitioned MV-22 squadrons to nominalize the effects of aircraft age, 
operational tempo, and individual squadron maintenance proficiency. For the two 
squadrons, 2010 and 2014 were the first years as transitioned squadrons for VMM-161 
and 268 respectively. 
From January to December 2010, VMM-161 cannibalized a total of 83 aircraft 
components consisting of 41 separate part number items. VMM-268 conversely, 
cannibalized a total of 66 aircraft components consisting of 40 part number items from 
January to December 2014. Each squadron’s cannibalized components were sorted into 
the top 10 drivers to see their respective drivers during that period. Table 16 is the top 10 
cannibalizations for both squadrons in their first transition year. 
Table 16.   VMM-161 and VMM-268 Top Ten Cannibalizations. 
 
Adapted from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 6.8.2.1 data analyst, personal 
communication, June 5, 2015.  
The top 10 cannibalization drivers for both squadrons varied considerably 
between the two time periods, with only two components, VFG and MFD units common 
Components Count Components Count
GRIP ASSEMBLY,CONTR 6 WIRING HARNESS 4
INTERFACE UNIT,AUTO 5 DISPLAY UNIT 3
GENERATOR,VARIABLE, 4 GENERATOR,VARIABLE, 3
BLOWER,ENGINE,EAPS, 4 DISPLAY UNIT,MULTIF 2
FAIRING ASSEMBLY,AI 3 DISPLAY UNIT,DEU,AI 2
ACTUATOR,ELECTRO-ME 3 VALVE ASSEMBLY,MANI 2
COMPUTER,FLIGHT CON 3 TUBE ASSEMBLY,METAL 2
CONTROL UNIT,IC,AIR 3 CONTROL COLUMN,AIRC 2
DISPLAY UNIT,MULTIF 3 HARNESS,ELECTRICAL,                     2
CONTROL ASSY LANDING 2 HOSE,AIR DUCT 2
VMM-161 Top Ten Cannibalizations for 2010 VMM-268 Top Ten Cannibalizations for 2014
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to both squadrons. For VMM-161, the combined top 10 list of components accounted for 
43% of the squadrons overall cannibalization, while VMM-268’s top 10 accounted for 
36% of their total cannibalizations. Between the two squadrons, 81 combined 
nomenclatures were cannibalized; of this number, only nine nomenclatures were common 
to both squadrons. The remaining 71 component part numbers varied between the two 
squadrons and did not cross reference as being cannibalized by both squadrons. 
The two squadrons were compared at the same phase of their transitioning periods 
with each operating aircraft that were received from Bell-Boeing aircraft production 
plant. Even though the received aircraft should have all accumulated about the same 
airframe hours during the period of observation, the list of components could also have 
varied for two reasons. First, some components installed in the 2014 aircraft deliveries 
were upgraded components and had better reliability compared to those that were 
received in the 2010 aircraft deliveries. Second, the supply logistics system improved 
over the four year time gap, causing VMM-268 not to experience most of the same driver 
degraders that the community dealt with back in 2010.  
C. ANALYZING HOW CANNIBALIZATION AFFECTS AVAILABILITY 
High readiness demands was a major reasons identified why naval aviation 
squadrons practice aircraft cannibalization. As previously discussed, maintenance 
managers use this practice to consolidate multiple NMCS discrepancies against a few 
aircraft to increase their MC rate, thereby increasing the number of aircraft available to 
support flight operations.  
Chapter 10 of Jones (2006) defines Availability as “The probability that an item is 
in an operable and committable state when called for at an unknown (random) time” (p. 
10.1). In the naval aviation community, aircraft that are in an operable state are classified 
as MC aircraft. However, not all MC aircraft are in a committable state to be put toward 
operational flights. This is because aircraft that require functional check flights (FCF) are 
also calculated as part of the number of MC aircraft. An aircraft that is operable and 
committable to an operational flight is classified as a ready basic aircraft (RBA) in the 
naval aviation community. 
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The researcher attempted to establish a statistical relationship between RBA and 
number of cannibalizations, to uncover how the number of RBA is affected by the 
number of cannibalizations performed within in a given period. To accomplish this, the 
consolidated 2014 monthly AMSRR and 3M matrix was utilized. This matrix contained 
all 2014 monthly aircraft readiness measurement parameters as well as 3M data for all the 
MV-22 operational squadrons.  
A correlation between the RBA column and the number of cannibalizations 
column was run, and revealed a correlation coefficient of 0.1392. As previously 
discussed, a correlation coefficient establishes the linear relationship between two 
variables. Coefficients of 0.3 and below indicate a weak positive relationship between the 
two variables. In this this case, the calculated coefficient of 0.1392 indicated a very weak 
to almost no linear relationship between RBA and the number of cannibalizations 
performed.  
A scatter plot of the two variables was produced in Figure 13 to see the dispersion 
and examine if there was a goodness of fit for a linear trendline on the plots.  
Figure 13.  Number of RBA versus Number of Cannibalizations Plot. 
 
Adapted from Marine Aircraft Group 26 MV-22 current readiness analyst, personal 
communication, May 5, 2015. 
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Figure 13 showed no correlation or significant linear relationship between RBA 
and the number of cannibalizations performed. It showed no clear evidence to indicate 
that the number of RBA increases or decreases with activity of the number of parts 
cannibalized. The R-squared value of 0.0082 for the trendline was very weak, indicating 
a poor fit of the trendline on the plotted points.  
To further investigate the effect of number of cannibalizations on RBA, a 
multivariate regression was performed with RBA as the dependent variable, against seven 
independent variables. The seven independent variables selected were number of aircraft 
assigned, number of aircraft in out of reporting (OOR) status, number of MC aircraft, 
NMCM-scheduled hours, NMCM-unscheduled hours, NMCS hours, and number of 
cannibalizations. Using a significance level of 0.05, the regression produced the output 
results in Table 17. 
Table 17.   Summary Regression Output 1 (RBA versus Cannibalizations, 
Assigned, OOR, MC, NMCM-S, NMCM-U, NMCS). 
 
Adapted from Marine Aircraft Group 26 MV-22 current readiness analyst, personal 
communication, May 5, 2015. 
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The summary Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) output in Table 17 proved the 
regression model to be a very good model of the independent variables against the RBA 
dependent variable. The model’s coefficient of determination or R-squared value of 
0.9460 indicated that approximately 95 % of the variability in RBA was explained by the 
independent variables in the model. The approximately 5% unexplained variability could 
be attributed to individual squadron maintenance practices and other factures not 
captured in this model.  
The model’s F-Statistic value proved the model to be a very significant model. An 
F-Statistic value tests the probability that all the regression coefficients are zero, to allow 
acceptance or rejection of a null hypothesis. In the case of this model, the F-statistic value 
of 9.829E-139 proved that there was almost a 0% probability that all of our regression 
coefficients are zero, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis and consequently making 
the model a very significant model.  
The p-value of the number of cannibalizations (0.6575) indicates that the number 
of cannibalizations is not significant in determining availability. This finding however is 
not consistent with previous literature and current naval aviation mindset of using 
cannibalization to increase aircraft availability. 
A correlation test of the independent variables was performed to see if a case of 
possible multicollinearity existed between the cannibalization variable and any of the 
other six independent variables. Results from the correlation test identified possible 
multicollinearity between cannibalizations and number of aircraft assigned, as well as 







Table 18.   Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables. 
 
Adapted from Marine Aircraft Group 26 MV-22 current readiness analyst, personal 
communication, May 5, 2015. 
This matrix revealed that the two variables were highly correlated with the 
cannibalization variable. This high correlation intuitively was possible because a 
squadron’s number of cannibalizations can be expected to increase as their number of 
assigned aircraft is increased and vice versa. On the other hand, a squadron’s 
accumulated NMCS hours can be expected to increase as more parts are cannibalized. 
This is because cannibalization actions are taken to temporarily resolve an AWP situation 
for maintenance actions that are already sitting in a NMCS status.  
The data for the two identified variables were removed to see if the P-value of the 
cannibalization variable would change with a new ANOVA test. A new regression with 
the dependent RBA variable against the five remaining independent variables produced 









Table 19.   Summary Regression Output 2 (RBA versus Cannibalizations, 
OOR, MC, NMCM-U, NMCM-S). 
 
Adapted from Marine Aircraft Group 26 MV-22 current readiness analyst, personal 
communication, May 5, 2015. 
The output ANOVA model with the five independent variables still proved to be a 
very significant model, The F-statistical significance increased slightly from the previous 
9.8287E-139 to 1.744E-132 but still maintained its integrity as a very significant model. 
The R-squared value also decreased from the previous 0.9460 to 0.9349, thereby 
increasing the model’s unexplained variability in RBA to approximately 7%. The P-value 
for cannibalization however increased from 0.6575 to 0.6784, still maintaining our 
original inference that number of cannibalizations has little to no effect on a squadron’s 
RBA or aircraft availability. This inference again intuitively made sense due to, but not 
limited to, some of the following reasons: 
Not all work orders initiated at the squadron level to cannibalize components turn 
out to be successful. Some of the components end up breaking during the attempted 
removal and installation process due to either maintenance error or the complexity of the 
removal and installation process. This, therefore, causes the attempted cannibalization 
action to not have the desired increasing effect on the number of RBA aircraft.  
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Some aircraft components as already discussed require removing other 
components to facilitate the cannibalization maintenance action. The associated risk of 
breaking any of the removal to FOM components is real and happens quite often on any 
aviation platform. This again can increase the amount of time that a NMC aircraft can 
remain in that status until the discrepancy is corrected.  
Cannibalizing a part from one aircraft to another often breaks the integrity of an 
already functioning system on the donor aircraft. These actions sometimes introduces 
new discrepancy maintenance actions that can require further system troubleshooting 
long after the cannibalized part is received from the supply system. This ultimately 
lengthens the NMC status of the donor aircraft and effectively maintaining the aircraft’s 
non-RBA status.  
Cannibalizing a part can effectively return an aircraft from NMC to MC status; 
however, the aircraft can immediately become NMC again for another discrepancy not 
related to the original discrepancy. This results in the cannibalization action consequently 
showing just momentarily, the increasing effect of the cannibalization action on aircraft 
availability. 
Lastly, cannibalizing a component from an aircraft, often opens the door to 
cannibalize additional needed components from an already NMCS cannibalized aircraft. 
This in effect also holds the cannibalized aircraft in a NMC status for longer periods than 
might have been anticipated, ultimately maintaining the aircrafts non RBA status. 
In conclusion, it appeared that cannibalizations have no significant main effect on 
fleet aircraft availability. Cannibalizations may interact with other variables to create a 
modest effect on availability, however, that effect is not tested in this thesis.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented and analyzed into detail, the different data collected from 
the sources described in Chapter III. Using the data, research strategy and various 
tools/techniques mentioned in Chapter III, each of the research questions identified in 
Chapter I was systematically investigated and the results thereof, presented in tabular and 
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graphical format. Staying within the scope of the thesis, each or the researchers proposed 
area of investigation has been explored. The conclusions and recommendations of the 
research will be presented in Chapter V. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter of the thesis provides the conclusions and recommendations that 
resulted from the analysis of MV-22 aircraft cannibalization in Chapter IV. The research 
examined 13 MV-22 squadrons, to investigate how the practice of cannibalization varied 
in the community, which aircraft components drove cannibalizations, and lastly, how 
cannibalization affected aircraft availability.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
 The following are the conclusions drawn from the researcher’s analysis: 
Among  the NAMP’s seven cannibalization malfunction codes, 815 (Repairable 
part carried but not on hand in local supply system) was the top-most reason why MV-22 
squadrons cannibalize. Reason code 814 (part not readily available within the required 
time constraint) was the second-most reason why squadrons cannibalize. Reason code 
813 (inter-squadron cannibalizations directed by higher authority) was the third-most 
reason for cannibalizations in the community. This pattern of cannibalization was 
observed to be a common trend in the community between the two coasts observed. 
However, other significant variations in cannibalizations were observed at the individual 
squadron level in the other codes. 
 The analysis revealed that some particular squadrons consistently receive more 
direction by higher authority to perform inter-squadron cannibalizations (code 813) more 
so than others. In the researcher’s opinion, and based of his personal experience, 
squadrons with higher aircraft readiness rates or lower in priority on training exercise 
employment plans (TEEP) typically receive more direction to perform inter-squadron 
cannibalization to support squadrons with lower aircraft readiness or those higher in 
TEEP priority. Although this is not a fair practice for the “donor” squadron, the 
researcher believes this is how the community worked around some of its initial logistical 
challenges to get the V-22 program where it is today.  
Another significant observation made was in the documentation of repairable 
cannibalizations under the 815 and 816 malfunction codes. The analysis revealed that 
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some squadron maintainers inaccurately select the wrong code when documenting 
repairable cannibalizations. This is due to the close resemblance in the verbiage of the 
two codes in the NALCOMIS, making it appear that some squadrons cannibalize more 
“unique” repairable parts that are not carried in the local supply systems. A 
recommendation to correct this issue is provided in the Recommendations Section. 
Accumulated cannibalization MMHs documented by the selected squadrons 
showed huge variations from each other. Even when analyzed on a similar component 
basis, the MMHs documented for cannibalizing the same component showed 
significantly large variations from squadron to squadron. However, the exact reasons for 
these large variations could not be uncovered through this research. In the researcher’s 
opinion, two possible causes exist for these large variations: (1) Some squadrons might 
be over or under documenting their MMHs, or (2) these documented MMHs are in fact 
accurate, indicating that squadrons that document lower MMHs for removing 
components are more technically proficient at cannibalization. Until the real reasons for 
these significant variations are uncovered, the researcher believes it would be impractical 
to use cannibalization MMHs as a metric for comparing squadron performance. 
Cannibalization of consumable parts versus repairable parts varied widely in the 
community. On a percentage of consumable to repairable basis, the analysis revealed that 
the West Coast squadrons generally cannibalized more consumables parts and less 
repairable parts than the East Coast squadrons. The researcher believes the reason for this 
is the majority of newer aircraft found in the West Coast fleet compared to the East Coast 
fleet as a result of their different transition periods. The newer aircraft on the West Coast, 
based on the researchers experience and opinion, have much newer and upgraded 
repairable components which typically fail less often than those found in the older East 
Coast aircraft fleet. Effectively, the West Coast squadrons cannibalize less repairable 
parts than the East Coast squadrons. Additionally, MALS-16 on the West Coast does not 
have the same V-22 I-level resident expertise and capabilities as MALS-26 on the East 
Coast when it comes to fabricating some peculiar V-22 consumable parts. This causes 
those West Coast squadrons to often resort to cannibalizing those peculiar consumable 
parts that cannot be easily fabricated at their on-site MALS.   
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Cannibalization actions taken to correct aircraft degraded systems under the 11 
equipment operational capability (EOC) codes varied widely in the community. As 
anticipated, it was uncovered that cannibalization to correct NMC (Z-coded) degraded 
systems was the number one driver of cannibalizations in all squadrons observed. This 
supports previously written literature that squadrons perform cannibalization to return 
non-flyable aircraft to flyable status.  
Squadrons also cannibalized considerably to correct PMC degraded aircraft 
systems. All squadrons analyzed performed significant cannibalizations to regain combat 
mission, environmental extreme, and day/night instruments meteorological condition 
(IMC) capabilities on their PMC aircraft. Although PMC aircraft are technically mission 
capable, the magnitude of cannibalizations observed goes to support that squadrons also 
exhaust a considerable amount of maintenance hours to get PMC aircraft into FMC status 
for flying specific mission profiles. Based on how these PMC cannibalizations varied 
from squadron to squadron, it is believed that some squadrons have an internal drive to 
cannibalize in order to maintain specific number of FMC aircraft to keep them 
operationally ready at all times.  
When measured on a cannibalization rate basis, the West Coast V-22 squadrons 
generally performed better (lower rate) than the East Coast squadrons. When ranked on 
an average basis, VMMs 162,165,166, and 365 were found to be above average 
squadrons. VMMs 161,163,263,261, and VMMT-204 were found to be average 
squadrons, while VMMs 264,266,268, and 363 were found to be below average 
squadrons at cannibalization. Although identifying the specific causes for the observed 
differences is beyond the scope of this research, there are multiple potential factors that 
could have caused the differences. These factors are discussed under the 
Recommendations Section. 
MV-22 squadrons show increases in cannibalization rates when deployed due to 
increased OPTEMPO. MEU shipboard deployed squadrons were observed to generally 
have much higher cannibalization rates than the land based deployed squadrons. As 
supported by the analysis, with other things being equal, MEU shipboard squadrons can 
be expected to cannibalize more parts than land-based deployed squadrons. These 
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squadrons should therefore be better prepared and postured to better support their 
shipboard deployments. The research also consequently revealed that cannibalization 
rates for land based deployed squadrons can also be expected to increase if the squadrons 
rotate next into a MEU shipboard deployment.  
The shipboard deployed squadrons, for unknown reasons, were also observed to 
cannibalize a much higher number of consumable parts than their land based deployed 
counterparts. These squadrons should therefore be better prepared with fully replenished 
pre-expended consumable bins and I-level support capabilities prior to deploying to 
better support them afloat.  
Across the wide range of MV-22 aircraft components, power supplies, VFG, 
blade assemblies, panel assemblies and electronic components were found to be the top 
five readiness degraders respectively over the five year observed period. These 
components evidently caused the vast majority of V-22 cannibalizations in the 
community. Of these five components, VFGs and blade assemblies consistently showed 
an increasing trend in cannibalizations from 2010 to 2014. Persistently upward trending 
rates of these components may indicate problems due to part shortages, poor 
manufacturer reliability, inadequately written maintenance troubleshooting steps and 
poor squadron maintenance practices. These two components should therefore receive the 
attention of V-22 logisticians, IMs and the V-22 SSWG. 
Direct current generators, hydraulic drive units, blade assemblies, wiring 
harnesses, and Coanda Tube assemblies were observed to be the worst trending 
cannibalized components. These components, although not all major readiness degraders, 
were the top five parts that showed the worst increasing trend in cannibalization among 
all cannibalized V-22 parts. Their worse consistent upward trending through 2014 is a 
cause for alarm to indicate they have a greater potential to cause major readiness issues in 
the near future if not quickly addressed. These components should receive the immediate 
attention of V-22 logisticians, IMs and the V-22 SSWG.   
MV-22 cannibalizations are known to be performed with the intent of increasing 
aircraft availability in the squadrons; however, statistical tests performed in the research 
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revealed that cannibalizations have little to no effect on MV-22 aircraft availability. 
Cannibalizations, however, may interact with other variables to create a modest effect on 
squadron-level aircraft availability, or the variance in squadron-level aircraft availability 
but squadron-level effects were not tested in this research. The analysis in this thesis 
which showed that squadron flying hours was the biggest determinant of cannibalization 
might be seen as providing partial support for this idea. Since the analysis was 
correlational and not causal, it might be claimed that the analysis shows increased 
cannibalization leads to greater flight hours—rather than the other way around. However, 
this would need to be further explored in later research. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The current optimized NALCOMIS system has seen significant improvements 
from the legacy system; however, glitches still exist in the system which prevents 
accurate documentation of cannibalization actions. In reviewing the data, 347 
cannibalization work orders were found without an identifying EOC code. Components 
are cannibalized to either correct NMC or PMC discrepancies; the system should 
therefore be corrected to prevent documentation of cannibalizations without a 
corresponding EOC code.  
The true magnitude of consumable parts cannibalized in the MV-22 community is 
currently not accurately reflected by retrieving the 817 consumable malfunction code 
data. Sorting cannibalization work orders by Repairable Indicator to manually separate 
the repairable work orders from the consumable work orders is currently the only way to 
accurately capture the number of consumable parts cannibalized. The system should be 
corrected to accurately track consumable cannibalizations by its appropriate 817 
malfunction code as required by the NAMP.  
Due to slight similarities in the verbiage of the 815 and 816 codes, maintainers 
sometimes inaccurately document cannibalizations by selecting the wrong codes. A 
system modification to the verbiage of the two codes might be appropriate to assist 
maintainers in selecting the correct code and prevent further inaccurate documentation. 
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Squadrons report cannibalization MMHs as required by the NAMP. However, as 
discussed in the conclusions, huge variations exist between squadrons in documenting the 
required amount of MMHs used to cannibalize the same MV-22 components. The 
specific reasons for these variations in MMHs were not discovered in this research. 
However, the researcher believes the current cannibalization MMHs reported by 
squadrons should not be used as an appropriate metric to measure the true labor hour cost 
of cannibalization in the community, until MMHs reported or the MMH documentation 
process has been vetted to be accurate. If found not to be accurate, a more appropriate 
method to tease out the precise amount of labor hours used in cannibalizing components 
from the current MMHs documentation may be required.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The underlying rationale for any cannibalization is to improve availability, but 
this research found no significant relationship between cannibalization rates and 
availability. Further research is needed to determine how cannibalization interacts with 
other variables to impact MV-22 aircraft availability at the squadron level.  
A more in-depth study is required to determine why MV-22 MEU deployed 
shipboard squadrons generally have higher cannibalization rates than land based 
deployed squadrons, even though shipboard AVCALs are widely believed to be better 
postured than land-based deployable pack-ups  
Further research is required to determine why the cannibalization MMHs 
documented for removing the same MV-22 components varies significantly from 
squadron to squadron, and to investigate the accuracy of those reported MMHs.  
Some MV-22 squadrons were observed to perform much better at cannibalization 
than other squadrons. Many factors including the age of aircraft, the internal maintenance 
practices, the internal maintenance management, and the maintenance technical 
proficiencies can all contribute to better cannibalization practices. A more in-depth study 
is required to determine why some MV-22 squadrons perform better at cannibalization 
than others. 
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APPENDIX.  RECOMMENDED MV-22 CANNIBALIZATION BEST 
PRACTICES  
This list of recommended MV-22 cannibalization best practices was developed by 
the researcher from a number of background conversations held with V-22 maintenance 
personnel and SMEs during the data gathering process.  
 Meticulously select a donor aircraft that will facilitate only a few 
cannibalizations as possible. This requires carefully examining the impacts 
of the supply requisition’s estimated delivery date (EDD) on the donor 
aircraft. For example, a requirement to cannibalize a part for an 
outstanding requisition that has an EDD of 30 Days should not be 
cannibalized from an aircraft that is anticipated to become MC within the 
next two weeks as it will prolong the NMC status of the donor aircraft. A 
cannibalization decision like this is a recipe to generate a hangar queen 
aircraft as it opens the door to cannibalize other needed parts that have 
longer EDDs. 
 Choosing a donor aircraft that minimizes the maintenance hours required 
to remove the cannibalizing part. All squadron assigned aircraft undergo 
corrective and preventative maintenance consistently that require opening 
up various aircraft access panels. When a need arises to cannibalize a part, 
maintenance managers need to carefully analyze all aircraft undergoing 
maintenance to identify which aircraft may already be opened up and 
provides a quick and easy access to remove the required part. This 
eliminates the requirement to dedicate maintenance hours to the removal 
of access panels on the desired donor aircraft, and shortening the overall 
cannibalization process. 
 Limit cannibalization of parts that require removal of other components to 
facilitate the maintenance action. The MV-22 aircraft is a complex aircraft 
with various parts that are sometimes not very easily accessible. Decisions 
to cannibalize parts that require FOM components often lead to secondary 
damages to other components, additional consumable material 
requirements, and the risk of damaging the part desired to be cannibalized. 
This also often leads to premature failure of the secondary components 
that were removed to facilitate the process. 
 Choosing a donor aircraft that has a guaranteed good working component 
is very important to avoid wasting MMHs. Most MV-22 installed 
components progressively provide indication of anticipated failure before 
they completely fail. Parts in this category that have indicated potential 
failure through intermittent faults and codes are not good candidates to 
cannibalize. This is because their failures are often accelerated by the 
 86
forced removal, and are better off if left installed in their original aircraft. 
A decision to still cannibalize components in this category only 
temporarily adds a MC aircraft till the components ultimate failure.  
 Cannibalization of components that require FCFs or that that require 
removal of other FCF required components should be carefully evaluated 
to ensure the decision is warranted. Most MV-22 FCF requirements are 
very exhaustive and more than often identify several other parts that were 
not anticipated to be bad. Cannibalizing parts in this category forces the 
donor aircraft to undergo FCFs that can potentially increase the 
maintenance workload for the donor aircraft due to unanticipated 
discrepancies. Additionally, cannibalizations that will require rotor track 
and balance can often commit the donor aircraft to undergo multiple FCFs 
to smooth out rotor balancing, which can hold the aircraft in a non RBA 
status for days until it passes the FCF. 
 Minimize or if possible, ignore decisions to cannibalize airframe related 
structural parts. A significant portion of V-22 airframe structural parts are 
riveted to the airframe and assume the form of the specific airframe they 
are attached to. Several attempts made in the community to cannibalize 
such parts have often ended up damaging additional parts because the 
cannibalized part from the donor aircraft did not line up correctly to the 
new aircraft. Maintainers in a desperate effort to make the parts fit on the 
new aircraft can often cause additional damage to the cannibalized part, or 
in an even worse scenario, cause major damage to the new aircrafts 
airframe. 
 Cannibalization of avionics components that are quick to remove and 
reinstall should be closely monitored and tightly controlled. The tendency 
for V-22 maintenance personnel to always want to cannibalize an avionics 
component on this avionics intensive platform is always very high. This 
practice if not monitored, breeds bad maintenance troubleshooting and 
fault isolation practices that lead to improperly identifying functioning 
components as being defective and requiring replacement. Since the part is 
easy to remove and readily available from another aircraft, the wrong call 
is often made to cannibalize this part, ultimately leading to the 
replacement of the wrong parts and the turn-in of RFI parts back into the 
repair cycle. 
 Cannibalization of engine exhaust related components in the infra-red 
section (IRS) should be performed only as a last resort. Due to the 
significant heat damage caused by the aircraft exhaust, components in this 
general area are not good candidates for cannibalization since they often 
have already sustained significant heat damage since their installation. 
Forcefully opening up an IRS section to cannibalize parts often results in 
several other IRS related parts from the donor aircraft needing to be turned 
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in for repair due to heat damage. The only recommended exception is if 
the donor aircrafts IRS section is already opened up for a scheduled 
inspection.  
 Cannibalization of components that prevents accessibility to other areas of 
the donor aircraft or will impair the mobility of the donor aircraft should 
be carefully thought through in order not to negatively impact other 
maintenance actions that might need to be performed while the donor 
aircraft is in a NMCS status. This concept if not carefully reasoned 
through can prevent scheduled and non-scheduled inspections from being 
completed on the donor aircraft, increasing its workload. This can 
significantly increase its NMC time even after the AWP requisition is 
received. 
 Cannibalization of parts from aircraft that are undergoing phased 
maintenance inspections should be carefully timed with the inspection 
schedule. Phase inspections, although usually longer in duration than other 
scheduled inspections, can be significantly delayed during the inspection 
period if the timing for outstanding cannibalized requisitions is not 
accurately planned with the inspection schedule. This can create a 
substantial backlog in the squadron’s phase inspection schedule and can 
often create long term effects in reducing the squadron’s total available 
aircraft hours.  
  Verbal communicating with the aviation supply department to re-confirm 
or re-verify the accurate status of an outstanding requisition can often 
make the difference between a good and a wasted cannibalization 
decision. Supply data system in-accuracies, coupled with inventory 
discrepancies and changing supply status codes often can lead to making a 
cannibalization decision, only to have the outstanding requisition 
delivered immediately following the cannibalization action. This leads to 
wasted MMHs that could have been avoided if proper steps were taken to 
confirm the requisitions accurate status.  
 The MMHs required to cannibalize a specific components should always 
play a vital role in making a decision to cannibalize. A part that requires a 
few hours to about half a maintenance shift to cannibalize can often be 
deemed an acceptable risk, while a part that requires a whole shift to 
cannibalize should require a legitimate and justified mission need. These 
MMHs required should also be compared against the transit time of the 
outstanding requisition to weigh the cost and benefit of the cannibalization 
decision. As an example, a requisition in shipping status that will arrive in 
three days should not be cannibalized if the MMHs required to cannibalize 
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